EFC · Read the filing

Item 1A. Risk Factors

Summary of Risk Factors

Risks Related To Our Investments and Investment Activities

•Challenging conditions in the mortgage, real estate, and financial markets—including economic downturns, inflation, elevated interest rates, declining property values, and tightening credit availability—could adversely affect the value of our investments and our financial performance. Market volatility and economic instability may lead to increased borrower delinquencies, declining liquidity, and reduced availability of financing, all of which could negatively impact our returns.

•Regulatory changes affecting Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae could materially impact mortgage market liquidity and valuations. Any changes in their government backing, capital requirements, or underwriting guidelines could disrupt the market for Agency RMBS and impact the pricing of our mortgage-related assets. Additionally, federal or state-level government intervention, such as mortgage modification programs, foreclosure moratoriums, or new regulations affecting loan servicing, could reduce the value of our assets or delay our ability to recover on defaulted loans.

•We are exposed to significant credit risks through our investments in residential and commercial mortgage loans, MBS, CRTs, and CLOs. Borrower delinquencies, defaults, and declining collateral values may result in losses, particularly in residential and commercial mortgage loans, non-Agency RMBS, CRTs, and loans with lower underwriting standards. Second-lien loans are especially vulnerable, as they are subordinate to first-lien loans and may suffer complete loss in foreclosure scenarios.

•Certain mortgage-backed securities and whole loans we acquire may have been underwritten with less stringent credit standards. Loans originated with reduced documentation requirements, high loan-to-value ratios, or weak borrower credit profiles pose a higher risk of delinquency and default, which may reduce the performance of non-Agency RMBS and CRT securities in which we invest. Additionally, sellers of mortgage loans we acquire may be unable or unwilling to repurchase defective loans, resulting in additional losses.

•We depend on third-party mortgage servicers and other service providers for the performance of many of our assets, including MSRs, RMBS, CRTs, securitizations, and loan pools. If servicers fail to perform effectively, including loss mitigation efforts or foreclosure processing, we may experience increased delinquencies, reduced cash flows, and reputational harm. We may also be affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices by third parties, which could cause delays and additional legal risks.

•Interest rate mismatches between our assets and liabilities could negatively impact our net interest income, particularly in periods of rising interest rates. Additionally, certain assets, such as adjustable-rate mortgages and hybrid ARMs, are subject to interest rate caps that may limit our ability to pass on higher interest costs, reducing profitability.

•We rely heavily on analytical models and third-party data for pricing, risk assessment, and portfolio management. If these models fail to accurately predict borrower behavior, prepayments, or credit performance, we could make suboptimal investment decisions that negatively affect our financial condition.

•Fluctuations in interest rates impact the performance of our assets. Rising rates can lead to higher borrowing costs, reduce demand for refinancing, and increase the risk of defaults on adjustable-rate loans. Conversely, falling rates may accelerate mortgage prepayments, reducing the expected cash flows from RMBS and MSRs. Interest rate mismatches between our assets and liabilities may also compress margins and impact profitability.

•The valuation of our investments is inherently uncertain, as many of our assets are illiquid and lack transparent pricing. The values we assign to these assets may fluctuate significantly due to market volatility, changing credit conditions, and external factors beyond our control.

Risks Related to Our Financing, Hedging, and Derivative Activities

•We use leverage to enhance returns, but this approach increases the magnitude of potential losses during adverse market conditions. Rising interest rates or liquidity constraints could limit our ability to obtain financing on favorable terms, forcing us to sell assets at inopportune times or reduce our investment activity.

•Our access to financing depends on the creditworthiness of our collateral and the willingness of lenders to provide credit. Disruptions in capital markets or changes in repo financing terms could restrict our ability to fund investments, subject us to margin calls, or force deleveraging at unfavorable prices.

•Hedging strategies, including interest rate swaps and other derivatives, may not fully protect us from market fluctuations. These instruments carry counterparty risk, and regulatory changes could impact their availability, cost, or effectiveness, potentially increasing our exposure to interest rate and credit risk.

Risks Related to Our Corporate Loans and CLOs

•We invest in corporate loans and CLOs, which expose us to credit and default risks. CLO structures involve leveraged investments in pools of corporate loans, and performance is dependent on the creditworthiness of the underlying borrowers. A rise in corporate defaults or economic downturns could impair cash flows to CLO securities and reduce their market value.

•The performance of our CLO investments is influenced by the actions of the applicable collateral managers, over whom we have limited control. Poor reinvestment decisions, excessive leverage, or adverse economic conditions could negatively impact CLO returns.

•Corporate borrowers in CLO portfolios are often highly leveraged, making them more susceptible to financial distress. Deterioration in credit markets or rising borrowing costs may increase defaults, reducing cash flows and increasing losses on our CLO investments.

Table of Contents

Risks Related to Certain MSR Investments

•Our MSR-related investments depend on the performance of third-party mortgage servicers. Servicing failures, regulatory penalties, or operational disruptions could negatively impact the value and cash flows associated with these assets.

•The value of MSRs is highly sensitive to interest rates. Falling rates may accelerate mortgage prepayments, reducing future servicing income and decreasing MSR valuations.

•We may be required to fund servicing advances on delinquent loans, which could create liquidity demands, particularly during market downturns or periods of increased borrower distress.

Risks Related to our Loan Origination and Servicing Businesses

•Our loan origination and servicing businesses require substantial capital, and our ability to sustain operations depends on access to financing and compliance with regulatory requirements. Changes in funding sources or regulatory capital requirements could impact profitability.

•The performance of our Longbridge business is highly dependent on government-backed reverse mortgage programs. Changes to FHA, VA, or Ginnie Mae policies could disrupt origination volumes, increase costs, or limit the availability of government insurance for HECM loans.

•We rely on third-party subservicers and service providers for compliance, loan administration, and operational support. Failures or deficiencies in their performance could expose us to financial, operational, and reputational risks.

Other Business Risks

•We may change our investment strategy, risk management policies, or REIT election without stockholder approval, which could impact our business model and future distributions.

•We operate in a competitive market for mortgage and structured finance investments. Competition for attractive investment opportunities may limit our ability to deploy capital efficiently or generate expected returns.

•Climate change and regulatory initiatives related to environmental risk may impact the properties underlying our mortgage investments, potentially increasing insurance costs or affecting real estate values in certain regions.

Risks Related to our Relationship with our Manager and Ellington

•We are dependent on Ellington and its personnel for investment management. The loss of key personnel or termination of our management agreement could materially impact operations and financial performance.

•Our Manager and Ellington manage multiple investment accounts, which may create conflicts of interest in allocating investment opportunities and resources.

•Our Manager’s incentive-based fee structure may encourage investments that carry higher risk, which may not align with the interests of our stockholders.

Risks Related to Our Common Stock and Preferred Stock

•Our stock price may be volatile, and stockholders may have limited liquidity when selling shares. Market fluctuations, interest rate changes, and broader economic trends may affect stock performance.

•Future issuances of debt or equity securities could dilute existing stockholders, increase leverage, or impact dividend distributions.

Risks Related to Our Organization and Structure

•Our certificate of incorporation and bylaws contain provisions that may discourage acquisition bids or stockholder activism, potentially limiting opportunities for stockholders to realize value.

•To maintain our REIT status, we are subject to ownership restrictions and limitations on stock transferability, which may impact stockholder rights and liquidity.

U.S. Federal Income Tax Risks

•Failure to maintain REIT qualification would subject us to significant corporate tax liabilities, reducing cash available for distributions and potentially impacting stockholder returns.

•Changes in tax laws or regulatory rulings could alter the tax treatment of REITs, negatively affecting our financial position, investment strategy, and distributions to stockholders.

•Complying with our election to be treated as REIT may cause us to forgo or liquidate otherwise attractive investments and/or may limit our ability to hedge efficiently.

•Complying with REIT requirements may limit our ability to hedge effectively.

The above list is not exhaustive, and we face additional challenges and risks. Please carefully consider all of the information in this Report, including the matters set forth below in this Item 1A.

Table of Contents

If any of the following risks occurs, our business, financial condition or results of operations could be materially and adversely affected. The risks and uncertainties described below are not the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties not presently known to us, or not presently deemed material by us, may also impair our operations and performance. In connection with the forward-looking statements that appear in our periodic reports on Form 10-Q and Form 10-K, our Current Reports on Form 8-K, our press releases and our other written and oral communications, stockholders should also carefully review the cautionary statements referred to in such reports and other communications referred to under "Special Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements."

Risks Related To Our Investments and Investment Activities

Difficult conditions in the mortgage and residential and commercial real estate markets as well as general market concerns may adversely affect the value of the assets in which we invest.

Our business is materially affected by conditions in the residential and commercial mortgage markets, the residential and commercial real estate markets, the financial markets, and the economy, including inflation, interest rates, energy costs, unemployment, geopolitical issues, tariffs, concerns over the creditworthiness of governments worldwide and the stability of the global banking system. In particular, the residential and commercial mortgage markets in the U.S. and Europe have experienced a variety of difficulties and challenging economic conditions in the past, including defaults, credit losses, and liquidity concerns. Certain commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, loan origination companies and mortgage-related investment vehicles incurred extensive losses from exposure to the residential and commercial mortgage markets as a result of these difficulties and conditions. These factors have impacted, and may in the future impact, investor perception of the risks associated with residential and commercial mortgage loans, MBS, other real estate-related securities and various other asset classes in which we may invest. As a result, values for residential and commercial mortgage loans, MBS, other real estate-related securities and various other asset classes in which we may invest have experienced, and may in the future experience, significant volatility. Any deterioration of the mortgage market and investor perception of the risks associated with residential and commercial mortgage loans, MBS, other real estate-related securities, and various other assets that we acquire could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

The federal conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and related efforts, along with any changes in laws and regulations affecting the relationship between Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae and the U.S. Government, could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

The payments we receive on our Agency RMBS depend upon a steady stream of payments on the underlying mortgages and such payments are guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association, or "Fannie Mae," the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or "Freddie Mac," or GNMA. In addition, Longbridge originates and services HECMs, which are insured by FHA, and which are eligible for inclusion in Ginnie Mae-guaranteed HMBS. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises, or "GSEs," but their guarantees are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. Ginnie Mae, which guarantees MBS backed by federally insured or guaranteed loans primarily consisting of loans insured by FHA, or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, or "VA," is part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and its guarantees are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. Finally, cash flows from our MSR-related investments depend on the performance of the underlying loans.

In September 2008, in response to the deteriorating financial condition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S. Government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, or "FHFA," their federal regulator, pursuant to its powers under The Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, a part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Under this conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to reduce the amount of mortgage loans they own or for which they provide guarantees on Agency RMBS. In addition to the FHFA becoming the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S. Treasury entered into Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements ("PSPAs") with the FHFA and have taken various actions intended to provide Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with additional liquidity in an effort to ensure their financial stability. In January 2025, the FHFA and the U.S. Treasury under the Biden Administration announced an agreement with each of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to modify the PSPAs to help ensure that the eventual release of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from conservatorship will be orderly and reflect certain existing practices. In addition, under a separate side letter from FHFA to the U.S. Treasury, FHFA will solicit public input, before releasing either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac from conservatorship, regarding the potential impacts on the housing market and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in federal conservatorship, the guarantee payment structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has been discussed and re-examined by regulators and administrations.

Table of Contents

Recent statements made by members of the current administration could introduce significant uncertainty to the housing finance system. These and any future initiatives, which could include efforts to privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and end their federal conservatorship, could reduce or eliminate the availability of government guarantees, increase mortgage rates, and lower the value of Agency RMBS. Additionally, proposed leadership changes at the FHFA and shifts in regulatory priorities may further impact the guarantees provided by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, increasing market volatility and credit risk. These developments could materially adversely affect our investments, financing capabilities, and overall financial condition.

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae could each be dissolved, and the U.S. Government could determine to stop providing liquidity support of any kind to the mortgage market. If Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae were eliminated, or their structures were to change radically, or if the U.S. Government significantly reduced its support for any or all of them, the value of our currently held Agency RMBS could drop significantly, and we may be unable or significantly limited in our ability to acquire Agency RMBS, which, in turn, could materially adversely affect our ability to maintain our exclusion from registration as an investment company under the Investment Company Act and our ability to maintain our qualification as a REIT. Such changes could also materially adversely affect Longbridge, including its ability to originate HECMs and securitize them through HMBS. With respect to HECM loans that are insured by FHA, the extent of the insurance is limited, and there are situations where the servicer will not recoup all cash outlays. In instances where the servicer is unable to liquidate the underlying REO property within certain timeframes and guidelines, FHA insurance proceeds will be determined relative to an appraised value of the subject property. If the eventual sale price of the related REO property is lower than the appraisal, the servicer will be exposed to an additional loss.

Moreover, any changes to the nature of the guarantees provided by, or laws affecting, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae could materially adversely affect the credit quality of the guarantees, could increase the risk of loss on purchases of Agency RMBS issued by these GSEs (or MSRs with underlying loans guaranteed by these GSEs) and could have broad adverse market implications for the Agency RMBS they currently guarantee. Any action that affects the credit quality of the guarantees provided by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae could materially adversely affect the value of our Agency RMBS and our Forward MSR-related investments. In addition, any market uncertainty that arises from such proposed changes could have a similar impact on us and our Agency RMBS and our Forward MSR-related investments.

In addition, we rely on our Agency RMBS as collateral for our financings under the repos that we enter into. Any decline in their value, or perceived market uncertainty about their value, would make it more difficult for us to obtain financing on our Agency RMBS on acceptable terms or at all, or to maintain compliance with the terms of any financing transactions.

Mortgage loan modification programs and future legislative action may adversely affect the value of, and the returns on, our targeted assets.

The U.S. Government, through the U.S. Treasury, FHA, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or "FDIC," has at various points in time, including in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and may again in the future, implement programs designed to provide homeowners with assistance in avoiding mortgage loan foreclosures. The programs may involve, among other things, the modification of mortgage loans to reduce the principal amount of the loans or the rate of interest payable on the loans, or to extend the payment terms of the loans.

Loan modification and refinance programs may adversely affect the performance of Agency and non-Agency RMBS, residential mortgage loans and MSRs. In the case of non-Agency RMBS, a significant number of loan modifications with respect to a given security, including those related to principal forgiveness and coupon reduction, could negatively impact the realized yields and cash flows on such security. Similarly, principal forgiveness and/or coupon reduction could negatively impact the performance of any residential mortgage loans, RMBS or MSRs we own. See "—Prepayment rates can change, adversely affecting the performance of our assets."

The U.S. Congress and various state and local legislatures may pass mortgage-related legislation that would affect our business, including legislation that would permit limited assignee liability for certain violations in the mortgage loan origination process, legislation that would allow judicial modification of loan principal in the event of personal bankruptcy, or legislation related to the handling of escrow accounts. We cannot predict whether or in what form Congress or the various state and local legislatures may enact legislation affecting our business or whether any such legislation will require us to change our practices or make changes in our portfolio in the future. These changes, if required, could materially adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders, particularly if we make such changes in response to new or amended laws, regulations or ordinances in any state where we acquire a significant portion of our mortgage loans, or if such changes result in us being held responsible for any violations in the mortgage loan origination process.

Table of Contents

The existing loan modification programs, together with future legislative or regulatory actions, including possible amendments to the bankruptcy laws, which result in the modification of outstanding residential mortgage loans and/or changes in the requirements necessary to qualify for refinancing mortgage loans with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae, may adversely affect the value of, and the returns on, our assets, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

The principal and interest payments on our residential mortgage whole loans, non-Agency RMBS and CRTs are not guaranteed by any entity, including any government entity or GSE, and therefore are subject to increased risks, including credit risk.

Our portfolio includes residential mortgage whole loans that do not conform to the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting guidelines, as well as non-Agency RMBS and CRT which are backed by, or reference, such mortgage loans. Examples of such mortgage loans include subprime, manufactured housing, Alt-A, prime jumbo, non-QM, and single-family-rental mortgage loans. Consequently, the principal and interest on such mortgage loans, non-Agency RMBS and CRTs are not guaranteed by GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or, in the case of Ginnie Mae, the U.S. Government.

A residential mortgage loan is typically secured by single-family residential property and is subject to risks of delinquency and foreclosure and risk of loss. The ability of a borrower to repay a loan secured by a residential property is dependent upon the income or assets of the borrower. A number of factors, including a general economic downturn, high unemployment, high energy costs, acts of God, pandemics such as the COVID-19 pandemic, war or other geopolitical conflict, terrorism, elevated inflation, tariffs, social unrest, and civil disturbances, may impair borrowers' abilities to repay their mortgage loans. In periods following home price declines, "strategic defaults" (decisions by borrowers to default on their mortgage loans despite having the ability to pay) also may become more prevalent. Additionally, these risks are exacerbated with respect to second-lien mortgage loans (including HELOCs and closed-end second lien loans), which are especially vulnerable to borrower distress and defaults, as they are subordinate to first-lien loans and only recover value after the first-lien obligations have been satisfied. As a result, losses on second-lien mortgage loans tend to be higher in foreclosure scenarios, and recovery prospects are significantly weaker, especially in declining real estate markets or economic downturns. Further, recent increases in mortgage rates have led to significant higher monthly costs for homeowners who have purchased their homes recently, and they have also led to slower prepayments of older, more affordable mortgages, each of which could lead to an increase in defaults on the mortgage loans underlying many of our investments.

In the event of the bankruptcy of a mortgage loan borrower, the mortgage loan to such borrower will be deemed to be secured only to the extent of the value of the underlying collateral at the time of bankruptcy (as determined by the bankruptcy court), and the lien securing the mortgage loan will be subject to the avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to the extent the lien is unenforceable under state law. We are also exposed to a potential reduction in a borrower's mortgage debt by a bankruptcy court. Foreclosure of a mortgage loan can be an expensive and lengthy process which could have a substantial negative effect on our anticipated return on the foreclosed mortgage loan. In many jurisdictions, legislation has been enacted that has the effect of making the foreclosure process more difficult, lengthier, and more expensive, and additional such legislation may be enacted in the future.

Residential mortgage loans are also subject to property damage caused by hazards, such as earthquakes, fires or environmental hazards, not covered by standard property insurance policies, or "special hazard risk." Special hazard-related risks also include the risk of rising property insurance costs, the risk of insurers cancelling or non-renewing insurance coverage, and climate-related risks, particularly in regions affected by hurricanes, droughts, wildfires, and flooding. In addition, certain claims may be assessed against us on account of our position as a mortgage holder or property owner, including assignee liability, environmental hazards, and other liabilities, including property taxes, each of which may further increase potential losses on certain of our investments. In some cases, these liabilities may be "recourse liabilities" or may otherwise lead to losses in excess of the purchase price of the related mortgage or property.

Non-Agency RMBS and CRTs are subject to many of the risks of the respective underlying mortgage loans. If borrowers default on the mortgage loans backing our non-Agency RMBS or CRTs and we are unable to recover any resulting loss through the foreclosure process, it could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Less stringent underwriting guidelines and the resultant potential for delinquencies or defaults on certain mortgage loans could lead to losses on many of the non-Agency RMBS and European RMBS that we hold.

Some of the non-Agency RMBS in which we invest are collateralized by Alt-A and subprime mortgage loans, which are mortgage loans that were originated using less stringent underwriting guidelines than those used in underwriting prime mortgage loans (mortgage loans that generally conform to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting guidelines). In addition, we have acquired, and may acquire in the future, European RMBS, including retained tranches from European RMBS

Table of Contents

securitizations in which we have participated. These European RMBS are backed by residential mortgage loans that were typically originated using less stringent underwriting guidelines than those used in underwriting prime mortgage loans in the United States. The underwriting guidelines for the mortgage loans that collateralize many of the non-Agency RMBS and European RMBS in which we invest are more permissive as to borrower credit history or credit score, borrower debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, and/or as to documentation (such as whether and to what extent borrower income was required to be disclosed or verified). In addition, even when specific underwriting guidelines are represented by loan originators as having been used in connection with the origination of mortgage loans, there can be no assurance that these guidelines have actually been followed, and/or will be followed in the future, as a result of aggressive lending practices, fraud (including borrower or appraisal fraud), or other factors. Mortgage loans that are underwritten pursuant to less stringent or looser underwriting guidelines, or that are poorly underwritten to their stated guidelines, have experienced, and should be expected to experience in the future, substantially higher rates of delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures than those experienced by mortgage loans that are underwritten in a manner more consistent with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guidelines. Thus, because of the higher delinquency rates and losses associated with Alt-A, subprime mortgage loans and European mortgage loans, the performance of RMBS backed by Alt-A, subprime mortgage loans, and European mortgage loans that we may acquire could be correspondingly adversely affected, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

We have invested and may in the future invest in securities in the CRT sector that are subject to mortgage credit risk.

We have invested and may in the future invest in credit risk transfer securities, or "CRTs." CRTs are designed to transfer a portion of the mortgage credit risk of a pool of insured or guaranteed mortgage loans from the insurer or guarantor of such loans to CRT investors. In a CRT transaction, interest and/or principal of the CRT is written off following certain credit events, such as delinquencies, defaults, and/or realized losses, on the underlying mortgage pool. To date, the vast majority of CRTs consist of risk sharing transactions issued by the GSEs, namely Fannie Mae's Connecticut Avenue Securities program, or "CAS," and Freddie Mac's Structured Agency Credit Risk program, or "STACR." These securities have historically been unsecured and subject to the credit risk of the underlying mortgage pool. In the future, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may issue CRTs with a variety of other structures.

We rely on analytical models and other data to analyze potential asset acquisition and disposition opportunities and to manage our portfolio. Such models and other data may be incorrect, misleading or incomplete, which could cause us to purchase assets that do not meet our expectations or to make asset management decisions that are not in line with our strategy.

We rely on our Manager and our Manager relies on the analytical models (both proprietary and third-party models) of Ellington and information and data supplied by Ellington itself and by third parties. These models and data may be used to value assets or potential asset acquisitions and dispositions and also in connection with our asset management activities. If Ellington's models (including the data utilized by the models) and/or third-party data prove to be incorrect, misleading, or incomplete, any decisions made in reliance thereon could expose us to potential risks. Our Manager's reliance on Ellington's models and data may induce it to purchase certain assets at prices that are too high, to sell certain other assets at prices that are too low, or to miss favorable opportunities altogether. Similarly, any hedging activities that are based on faulty models and data may prove to be unsuccessful.

Some of the risks of relying on analytical models and third-party data include the following:

•collateral cash flows and/or liability structures may be incorrectly modeled in all or only certain scenarios, or may be modeled based on simplifying assumptions that lead to errors;

•information about assets or the underlying collateral may be incorrect, incomplete, or misleading;

•asset, collateral or MBS historical performance (such as historical prepayments, defaults, cash flows, etc.) may be incorrectly reported, or subject to interpretation (e.g., different MBS issuers may report delinquency and default statistics based on different definitions of what constitutes a delinquent or defaulted loan); and

•asset, collateral or MBS information may be outdated, in which case the models may contain incorrect assumptions as to what has occurred since the date information was last updated.

Some models, such as prepayment models or default models, may be predictive in nature. The use of predictive models has inherent risks. For example, such models may incorrectly forecast future behavior, leading to potential losses. In addition, the predictive models used by our Manager may differ substantially from those models used by other market participants, with the result that valuations based on these predictive models may be substantially higher or lower for certain assets than actual market prices. Furthermore, because predictive models are usually constructed based on historical data supplied by third parties, the success of relying on such models may depend heavily on the accuracy and reliability of the supplied historical data, and, in the case of predicting performance in scenarios with little or no historical precedent (such as extreme broad-based declines in

Table of Contents

home prices, deep economic recessions or depressions), such models must employ greater degrees of extrapolation and are therefore more speculative and of more limited reliability.

All valuation models rely on correct market data inputs. If incorrect market data is entered into even a well-founded valuation model, the resulting valuations will be incorrect. However, even if market data is input correctly, "model prices" will often differ substantially from market prices, especially for securities with complex characteristics or whose values are particularly sensitive to various factors. If our market data inputs are incorrect or our model prices differ substantially from market prices, our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders could be materially adversely affected.

Prepayment rates can change, adversely affecting the performance of our assets.

The frequency at which prepayments (including both voluntary prepayments by borrowers and liquidations due to defaults and foreclosures) occur on mortgage loans, including those underlying our RMBS and Forward MSR-related investments, is affected by a variety of factors, including the prevailing level of interest rates as well as economic, demographic, tax, social, legal, and other factors. Generally, borrowers tend to prepay their mortgages when prevailing mortgage rates fall below the interest rates on their mortgage loans. When borrowers prepay their mortgage loans at rates that are faster or slower than expected, it results in prepayments that are faster or slower than expected on such loans or the related RMBS, Forward MSR-related investments or Reverse MSRs. These faster or slower than expected payments may adversely affect our profitability.

We may purchase securities or loans that have a higher interest rate than the then-prevailing market interest rate. In exchange for this higher interest rate, we may pay a premium to par value to acquire the security or loan. In accordance with U.S. GAAP, we amortize this premium as an expense over the expected term of the security or loan based on our prepayment assumptions. If a security or loan is prepaid in whole or in part at a faster than expected rate, however, we must expense all or a part of the remaining unamortized portion of the premium that was paid at the time of the purchase, which will adversely affect our profitability.

We also may purchase securities or loans that have a lower interest rate than the then-prevailing market interest rate. In exchange for this lower interest rate, we may pay a discount to par value to acquire the security or loan. We accrete this discount as income over the expected term of the security or loan based on our prepayment assumptions. If a security or loan is prepaid at a slower than expected rate, however, we must accrete the remaining portion of the discount at a slower than expected rate. This will extend the expected life of our investment portfolio and result in a lower-than-expected yield on securities and loans purchased at a discount to par.

Prepayment rates generally increase when interest rates fall and decrease when interest rates rise. Since many RMBS, especially fixed rate RMBS, will be discount securities when interest rates are high, and will be premium securities when interest rates are low, these RMBS may be adversely affected by changes in prepayments in any interest rate environment. Prepayments may also result from borrowers’ desire to monetize a portion of the equity in their homes (“cash-out” refinancing); since higher home values (and therefore also homeowners' equity) are often correlated with lower interest rates, higher cash-out refinancing activity is also often correlated with lower interest rates. Prepayment rates are also affected by factors not directly tied to interest rates or home values, and these factors are difficult to predict. Prepayments can also occur when borrowers sell their properties or when borrowers default on their mortgages and the mortgages are prepaid from the proceeds of a foreclosure sale of the underlying property and/or from the proceeds of a mortgage insurance policy or other guarantee. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will generally, among other conditions, purchase mortgages that are 120 days or more delinquent from the Agency RMBS pools that they have issued when the cost of guaranteed payments to security holders, including advances of interest at the security coupon rate, exceeds the cost of holding the non-performing loans in their portfolios. Consequently, prepayment rates also may be affected by conditions in the housing and financial markets, which may result in increased delinquencies on mortgage loans. Prepayment rates can also be affected by actions of the GSEs and their cost of capital, general economic conditions, and the relative interest rates on fixed and adjustable rate loans. Additionally, changes in the GSEs' decisions as to when to repurchase delinquent loans can materially impact prepayment rates on Agency RMBS.

The adverse effects of prepayments may impact us in various ways. First, particular investments may experience outright losses, as in the case of interest only securities, or "IOs," and inverse interest only securities, or "IIOs," in an environment of faster actual or anticipated prepayments. Second, particular investments may underperform relative to any hedges that our Manager may have constructed for these assets, resulting in a loss to us. In particular, prepayments (at par) may limit the potential upside of many RMBS to their principal or par amounts, whereas their corresponding hedges often have the potential for unlimited loss. Furthermore, to the extent that faster prepayment rates are due to lower interest rates, the principal payments received from prepayments will tend to be reinvested in lower-yielding assets, which may reduce our income in the long run.

Prepayments also significantly affect the value of MSRs because an MSR entitles the holder to receive a monthly servicing fee equal to a percentage of the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage loans, as well as other cashflows, for so long

Table of Contents

as the underlying loans are outstanding. To the extent the underlying mortgage loan principal balances are prepaid or expected to be prepaid at a faster rate, the expected future cash flows from servicing would be lower and the value of our MSR would decline. Actual prepayment rates differing from anticipated prepayment rates could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

In addition to the foregoing, prepayment risk and reinvestment risk also apply to our CLO investments. As part of the ordinary management of its portfolio, a CLO will typically generate cash flow from asset repayments and sales that is reinvested into substitute assets, subject to compliance with its investment tests and certain other conditions. If the CLO collateral manager causes the CLO to purchase substitute assets at a lower yield than those initially acquired, the excess interest-related cash flow available for distribution to the CLO equity tranches would decline. Furthermore, in most CLO transactions, CLO debt investors are subject to the risk that the holders of a majority of the equity tranche can direct a call or refinancing of a CLO, causing such CLO’s outstanding CLO debt securities to be repaid at par earlier than expected. This and other factors can cause considerable uncertainty in the average lives of the CLO tranches in which we invest.

Draw Rates on reverse mortgages can change in ways that adversely affect the value of reverse mortgages pools, IOs and MSRs.

Reverse mortgage borrowers often have an undrawn line of credit entitling the borrower to demand future draws from the servicer. A substantial portion of reverse MSR values comes from the expectation that while the servicer funds such future draws at par, it will be able to securitize and sell such future draws at a premium. However, recent interest rate volatility, interest rate increases, and policy uncertainty could significantly impact reverse mortgage draw rates, affecting the value of reverse mortgage loans, residual tranches, and MSRs. Elevated interest rates may discourage borrowers from drawing on their reverse mortgage lines of credit, reducing expected future cash flows for servicers. Additionally, if liquidity conditions tighten or securitization markets weaken, the ability to sell future draws at a premium could be impaired, further reducing reverse MSR values. Any regulatory changes affecting reverse mortgage lending, including potential CFPB or HUD actions, could also introduce additional risks to draw rate expectations and securitization economics. Therefore, lower than expected borrower draw rates may have a negative impact on the value of reverse MSRs, loans, and residual tranches.

Valuations of many of our assets are inherently uncertain, may be based on estimates, may fluctuate over short periods of time, and may differ from the values that would have been used if a ready market for these assets existed.

The values of many of the assets in our portfolio are not readily determinable with precision. We value the vast majority of our assets monthly at fair value, as determined in good faith by our Manager, subject to the oversight of our Manager's valuation committee. The determination of fair value and, consequently, the amount of unrealized gains and losses in our portfolio, are to a certain degree subjective. Because such valuations are inherently uncertain, may fluctuate over short periods of time, especially during periods of elevated market volatility, and may be based on estimates, our Manager's determinations of fair value may differ from the values that would have been used if a ready market for these assets existed or from the prices at which trades occur. Furthermore, we may not obtain third-party valuations for all of our assets. Changes in the fair value of our assets directly impact our net income and book value through recording unrealized appreciation or depreciation of our investments and derivative instruments, and so our Manager's determination of fair value has a material impact on our net income.

While in many cases our Manager's determination of the fair value of our assets is based on valuations provided by third-party dealers and pricing services, our Manager can and does value assets based upon its judgment and such valuations may differ from those provided by third-party dealers and pricing services. Valuations of certain assets are often difficult to obtain or are unreliable and certain of our credit and MSR interests, including our Forward MSR-related investments and our HMBS MSR Equivalent, trade infrequently and are illiquid. In general, dealers and pricing services heavily disclaim their valuations. Additionally, dealers and pricing services may claim to furnish valuations only as an accommodation and without special compensation, and so they may disclaim any and all liability for any direct, incidental, or consequential damages arising out of any inaccuracy or incompleteness in valuations, including any act of negligence or breach of any warranty. Depending on the complexity and illiquidity of an asset, valuations of the same asset can vary substantially from one dealer or pricing service to another. Higher valuations of our assets have the effect of increasing the amount of base management fees and incentive fees we pay to our Manager. Therefore, conflicts of interest exist because our Manager is involved in the determination of the fair value of our assets.

Market-based inputs are generally the preferred source of values for purposes of measuring the fair value of our assets under U.S. GAAP. However, the markets for our investments have experienced, and could in the future experience, extreme volatility, reduced transaction volume and liquidity, and disruption as a result of certain events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the regional banking crisis in 2023, ongoing geopolitical tensions, tariffs, and uncertainty in the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve (and other central banks), which has made, and could in the future make, it more difficult for our Manager, and for the third-party dealers and pricing services that we use, to rely on market-based inputs in connection with the valuation of our assets under U.S. GAAP. Furthermore, in determining the fair value of our assets, our Manager uses proprietary models

Table of Contents

that require the use of a significant amount of judgment and the application of various assumptions including, but not limited to, assumptions concerning future prepayment rates, interest rates, default rates and loss severities. These assumptions may be impacted by the unpredictability of interest rate movements, driven by inflation dynamics and shifting guidance from the Federal Reserve (and other central banks) and these assumptions might be especially difficult to project accurately during periods of economic disruption. The fair value of certain of our investments may fluctuate over short periods of time, and our Manager’s determinations of fair value may differ materially from the values that would have been used if a ready market for these investments existed. Investors purchasing our securities based on an overstated book value per share may pay a higher price than the value of our investments warrants. Conversely, investors selling shares during a period in which our book value per share understates the value of our investments may receive a lower price for their shares than the value of our investments warrants.

Our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders could be materially adversely affected if our Manager's fair value determinations of these assets were materially different from the values that would exist if a ready market existed for these assets.

We depend on third-party service providers, including mortgage servicers, for a variety of services related to our MSRs, MBS, CRTs, European assets, securitizations, and whole mortgage loans and loan pools. We are, therefore, subject to the risks associated with third-party service providers.

We depend on a variety of services provided by third-party service providers related to our MSRs, MBS, CRTs, European assets, securitizations, and whole mortgage loans and loan pools. We rely on the mortgage servicers who service the mortgage loans backing our MSRs, MBS, CRTs, our European assets, our securitizations, as well as the mortgage loans and loan pools that we own directly, to, among other things, collect principal and interest payments on the underlying mortgages and perform loss mitigation services. These mortgage servicers and other service providers, such as trustees, bond insurance providers, due diligence vendors, and custodians, may not perform in a manner that promotes our interests. In addition, legislation that has been enacted or that may be enacted in order to reduce or prevent foreclosures through, among other things, loan modifications, may reduce the value of our MSRs or the mortgage loans backing our MBS, CRTs, or whole mortgage loans that we acquire. Mortgage servicers may be incentivized by U.S. federal, state, or local governments to pursue such loan modifications, as well as forbearance plans and other actions intended to prevent foreclosure, even if such loan modifications and other actions are not in the best interests of the beneficial owners of the mortgage loans. In addition to legislation that creates financial incentives for mortgage loan servicers to modify loans and take other actions that are intended to prevent foreclosures, legislation has also been adopted that creates a safe harbor from liability to creditors for servicers that undertake loan modifications and other actions that are intended to prevent foreclosures. Finally, legislation has been adopted that delays the initiation or completion of foreclosure proceedings on specified types of residential mortgage loans or otherwise limits the ability of mortgage servicers to take actions that may be essential to preserve the value of the mortgage loans underlying the mortgage servicing rights. Any such limitations are likely to cause delayed or reduced collections from mortgagors and generally increase servicing costs. In addition, to the extent that we own the MSR related to a mortgage loan or have economic exposure to an MSR through an arrangement with a master servicer, we could be ultimately liable for any servicing infractions by a subservicer, and in certain cases, infractions related to the origination of the mortgage loans. To the extent that we or the related master servicer cannot recover any such losses from the originator or subservicer, we would suffer losses, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Additionally, our MSRs, MBS, CRTs, European assets, securitizations, and whole mortgage loans and loan pools could also be materially and adversely affected if the mortgage servicer is unable to service the underlying mortgage loans due to a failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations or as a result of new legislative actions, failure to perform its loss mitigation duties, a downgrade in its servicer rating, the failure to perform adequately in its external audits, or a failure in or performance of its operational systems or infrastructure.

Further, economic disruptions may result in liquidity pressures on servicers and other third-party vendors that we rely upon. Servicers and certain other parties are responsible for dealing with delinquent borrowers, and are responsible in certain capital markets securitization transactions for funding advances with respect to delinquent payments of principal and interest. Therefore, the more delinquent mortgagors there are, the more likely it is that servicers and other parties will experience increased expenses in dealing with delinquent borrowers and increased difficulties funding principal and interest advances. Financial strain on servicers, including as a result of rising delinquency rates, declining mortgage origination activity, industry consolidation, and/or margin compression, could increase counterparty risk and reduce effectiveness of servicing.

The negative impact of an economic disruption on the business and operations of such servicers or other parties responsible for funding such advances could be significant. If our third-party service providers, including mortgage servicers, do not perform as expected, our business, financial condition and results of operations, and ability to pay dividends to our stockholders could be materially adversely affected. See "—Our investments in MSR related assets expose us to additional risk of loss if our counterparty were unable to satisfy its obligation to us" and "—Risks Related to Our Loan Origination and Servicing Businesses—Longbridge relies on subservicers and other service providers to perform reverse mortgage servicing

Table of Contents

functions, which presents us with a number of risks."

We rely on mortgage servicers to service effectively, including loss mitigation efforts, and we also may engage in our own loss mitigation efforts with respect to whole mortgage loans that we own directly and such loss mitigation efforts may be unsuccessful or not cost effective.

Both default frequency and default severity of mortgage loans are highly dependent on the quality of the mortgage servicer. We depend on the effectiveness of servicing, including loss mitigation efforts of mortgage servicers and in some cases "special servicers," which are mortgage servicers who specialize in servicing non-performing loans. If mortgage servicers are not vigilant in encouraging borrowers to make their monthly payments, the borrowers are far less likely to make those payments. Additionally, servicers can perform loan modifications, which could potentially impact the value of our securities. The failure of servicers to effectively service the mortgage loans underlying the securities in our investment portfolio could negatively impact the value of our investments and our performance. In addition, for the whole mortgage loans that we own directly, we may engage in our own loss mitigation efforts over and beyond the efforts of the mortgage servicers, including more hands-on mortgage servicer oversight and management, borrower refinancing solicitations, as well as other efforts. Our and our mortgage servicers' loss mitigation efforts may be unsuccessful in limiting delinquencies, defaults, and losses, or may not be cost effective, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders. Our ability to accomplish such loss mitigation may also be limited by the tax rules governing REITs.

Servicer quality and effectiveness are of particular importance in the performance of non-agency loans and MBS. If a servicer is performing inadequately or goes out of business, the transfer of servicing to a new servicer takes time, and loans may become delinquent because of confusion or lack of attention. Recent regulatory scrutiny and enforcement actions against mortgage servicers, including increased penalties for noncompliance with consumer protection laws and fair servicing requirements, could impact servicer performance and increase costs associated with regulatory compliance. Additionally, disruptions in the servicing industry pose a risk to timely loan processing, payment collection, and loss mitigation efforts. Further, ongoing industry consolidation among mortgage servicers has led, and could continue to lead, to servicing transfer related disruptions. We have already experienced the adverse effects related to servicing transfers on certain of our mortgage loans. When servicing is transferred, the prior servicer’s advances (e.g., of delinquent interest, principal, taxes, or insurance) are often not recaptured efficiently by the new servicer, which in the case of securitized loans may have an adverse effect on non-agency MBS credit support. In the case of securitized loans, servicers may be required to advance interest on delinquent loans to the extent the servicer deems those advances recoverable. However, in the event the servicer does not advance such funds, interest may be interrupted, even on more senior securities. Servicers may also advance more than is in fact recoverable once a defaulted loan is disposed, and the loss to the securitization trust may be greater than the outstanding principal balance of that loan (i.e., greater than 100% loss severity). Finally, an increase in servicing costs, including as a result of an increase in the difficulty of or the costs related to loss mitigation efforts, would lower our yield on the relevant assets and could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

We may be affected by deficiencies in foreclosure practices of third parties, as well as related delays in the foreclosure process.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, one of the biggest risks affecting the residential mortgage loan, non-Agency RMBS, and European RMBS markets has been uncertainty around the timing and ability of servicers to foreclose on defaulted loans, so that they can liquidate the underlying properties and ultimately pass the liquidation proceeds through to RMBS holders. Given the magnitude of the 2008-2009 housing crisis, and in response to the well-publicized failures of many servicers to follow proper foreclosure procedures, mortgage servicers are being held to much higher foreclosure-related documentation standards than they previously were. However, because many mortgages have been transferred and assigned multiple times (and by means of varying assignment procedures) throughout the origination, warehouse, and securitization processes, mortgage servicers have had in the past, and may have in the future, much more difficulty furnishing the requisite documentation to initiate or complete foreclosures.

Delays in the foreclosure process may occur, both by operation of law and by delays in the judicial system. These delays lead to stalled or suspended foreclosure proceedings, and ultimately additional foreclosure-related costs. Foreclosure-related delays also tend to increase ultimate loan loss severities as a result of property deterioration, amplified legal and other costs, and other factors. Many factors delaying foreclosure, such as borrower lawsuits and judicial backlog and scrutiny, are outside of a servicer's control and have delayed, and will likely continue to delay, foreclosure processing in both judicial states (where foreclosures require court involvement) and non-judicial states. Furthermore, rising delinquency rates, particularly among lower-credit borrowers, may lead to an increase in foreclosure filings, further straining judicial and servicer capacity.

The concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure practices of servicers and related delays in the foreclosure process may impact our loss assumptions and has affected and may continue to affect the values of, and our returns on, our investments in RMBS and residential whole loans.

Table of Contents

To the extent that due diligence is conducted on potential assets, such due diligence may not reveal all of the risks associated with such assets and may not reveal other weaknesses in such assets, which could lead to losses.

Our Manager may decide to conduct (either directly or using third parties) certain due diligence on an investment before committing to the investment. There can be no assurance that our Manager will conduct any specific level of due diligence, or that, among other things, our Manager's due diligence processes will uncover all relevant facts or that any purchase will be successful, which could result in losses on these assets, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Sellers of the mortgage loans that we acquire, or that underlie the non-Agency RMBS or European RMBS in which we invest, may be unable to repurchase defective mortgage loans, which could have a material adverse effect on the value of our loans, or the loans held by the trust that issued the RMBS, and could cause shortfalls in the payments due on the RMBS or losses on the mortgage loans.

Sellers of mortgage loans that we acquire or that are sold to the trusts that issued the non-Agency RMBS or European RMBS in which we invest made various representations and warranties related to the mortgage loans sold by them to us or the trusts that issued the RMBS. If a seller fails to cure a material breach of its representations and warranties with respect to any mortgage loan in a timely manner, then we, or the trustee or the servicer of the loans, may have the right to require that the seller repurchase the defective mortgage loan (or in some cases substitute a performing mortgage loan). It is possible, however, that for financial or other reasons, the seller either may not be capable of repurchasing defective mortgage loans, or may dispute the validity of or otherwise resist its obligation to repurchase defective mortgage loans. The inability or unwillingness of a seller to repurchase defective mortgage loans from us or from a non-Agency RMBS trust or European RMBS trust in which we invest would likely cause higher rates of delinquencies, defaults, and losses for the mortgage loans we hold, or the mortgage loans backing such non-Agency RMBS or European RMBS, and ultimately greater losses for our investment in such assets.

Our assets include subordinated and lower-rated securities that generally have greater risk of loss than senior and higher-rated securities.

Certain securities that we acquire are deemed by rating agencies to have substantial vulnerability to default in payment of interest and/or principal. Other securities we acquire have the lowest quality ratings or are unrated. Many securities that we acquire are subordinated in cash flow priority to other more "senior" securities of the same securitization. Certain subordinated securities ("first loss securities") absorb all losses from default before any other class of securities is at risk. Such securities are therefore considered to be highly speculative investments.

In the case of CRTs and subordinated RMBS and CMBS, the risk of defaults on the underlying mortgages and/or declining real estate values is amplified (particularly in light of the distress in certain real estate sectors, such as the office sector), as are the risks associated with possible changes in the market's perception of any entity issuing or guaranteeing such securities, or by changes in government regulations and tax policies. In the case of CLOs, the risk of economic recession and declining creditworthiness of corporate borrowers would be amplified by rising corporate default rates, tightening credit conditions, and potential credit downgrades in leveraged loan markets. Accordingly, the subordinated and lower-rated (or unrated) securities in which we invest may experience significant price and performance volatility relative to more senior or higher-rated securities, and they are subject to greater risk of loss than more senior or higher-rated securities which, if realized, could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Increases in interest rates could negatively affect the value of our assets and increase the risk of default on our assets.

Our fixed-rate investments, especially most fixed-rate mortgage loans, fixed-rate MBS, and most MBS backed by fixed-rate mortgage loans, generally decline in value when long-term interest rates increase. Even in the case of Agency RMBS, the guarantees provided by GSEs do not protect us from declines in market value caused by changes in interest rates. In the case of RMBS backed by adjustable-rate mortgages, or "ARMs," increases in interest rates can lead to increases in delinquencies and defaults as borrowers become less able to make their mortgage payments following interest payment resets. Elevated interest rates (including mortgage rates) may contribute to lower housing affordability, increased borrower payment shocks upon ARM interest rate resets, a slowdown in (or reversal of) home price appreciation, and declines in commercial real estate prices, which could adversely impact borrower credit performance of both our residential and commercial mortgage loans. Additionally, an increase in short-term interest rates would increase the amount of interest owed on our repo borrowings, for which see "—Interest rate mismatches between our assets and our borrowings may reduce our income during periods of changing interest rates, and increases in interest rates could adversely affect the value of our assets." See also "— Certain actions by the Federal Reserve could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.”

Table of Contents

Changes in market conditions may cause a decrease in the issuance volumes of certain of our targeted assets, which could adversely affect our ability to acquire targeted assets that satisfy our investment objectives, and which could adversely affect the loan originators in which we invest.

Rising interest rates, elevated interest rate volatility and/or elevated yield spreads generally reduce the demand for mortgage loans due to the higher cost of borrowing. A reduction in the volume of mortgage loans originated may affect the volume of targeted assets available to us, which could adversely affect our ability to acquire assets that satisfy our investment objectives, and could also adversely affect the mortgage loan originators in which we are invested, whose businesses depend on demand from borrowers for mortgage loans. If changes in market conditions cause us to be unable to acquire a sufficient volume of our targeted assets with a yield that is above our borrowing cost, or adversely impact Longbridge and other loan originators in which we invest, our ability to satisfy our investment objectives and to generate income and pay dividends to our stockholders may be materially and adversely affected.

Interest rate mismatches between our assets and our borrowings may reduce our income during periods of changing interest rates, and increases in interest rates could adversely affect the value of our assets.

Some of our assets are fixed rate or have a fixed-rate component (such as non-QM loans, residential transition loans, and RMBS backed by hybrid ARMs). This means that the interest we earn on these assets will not vary over time based upon changes in a short-term interest rate index. Although the interest we earn on our ARMs, our RMBS backed by ARMs, and many of our CLO investments generally will adjust for changing interest rates, such interest rate adjustments may not occur as quickly as the interest rate adjustments to any related borrowings, and such interest rate adjustments will generally be subject to interest rate caps, which potentially could cause such assets to acquire many of the characteristics of fixed rate assets during periods of rising or high interest rates. We generally fund our targeted assets with borrowings whose interest rates reset frequently, and as a result we generally have an interest rate mismatch between our assets and liabilities, which could cause our net interest margin (the spread between the average yield on our assets and our average borrowing costs) to compress, or even become negative. While our interest rate hedges are intended to mitigate a portion of this mismatch, the use of interest rate hedges also introduces the risk of other interest rate mismatches and exposures, as will the use of other financing techniques. Additionally, to the extent cash flows from RMBS we hold are reinvested in new RMBS, the spread between the yields of the new RMBS and available borrowing rates may also compress or become negative. If our net interest margin compresses or becomes negative, our business, cash flow, financial condition, results of operations, and ability to pay dividends to our stockholders could be materially affected. In fact, in 2022, 2023 and 2024, which saw periods of rising interest rates, we experienced compressed, and in some cases negative, net interest margin on many of our assets.

Fixed-income assets, including many RMBS, typically decline in value if interest rates increase. If long-term rates were to increase significantly, such as we saw during 2022 and parts of 2023 and 2024, not only would the market value of these assets be expected to decline, but these assets could lengthen in duration because borrowers would be less likely to prepay their mortgages.

Interest rates can change quickly and are highly sensitive to many factors, including governmental monetary and tax policies, domestic and international economic and political considerations, and other factors beyond our control. Moreover, concerns over the United States’ debt ceiling and budget-deficit have increased the possibility of downgrades by rating agencies to the U.S. government’s credit rating, which could cause interest rates and borrowing costs to rise substantially. Interest rate movements are highly uncertain and notoriously difficult to predict. From February 28, 2022 to October 31, 2023, the lower bound of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Funds Target Rate rose from 0.00% to 5.25%, while the yield on the ten-year U.S. Treasury rose from 1.83% to 4.93%.

While we opportunistically hedge our exposure to changes in interest rates, such hedging may be limited by our intention to remain qualified as a REIT, and we can provide no assurance that our hedges will be successful, or that we will be able to enter into or maintain such hedges. As a result, interest rate fluctuations can cause significant losses, reductions in income, and can limit the cash available to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Interest rate caps on ARMs and hybrid ARMs, including those that back our RMBS, may reduce our net interest margin during periods of rising or high interest rates.

ARMs and hybrid ARMs (i.e., residential mortgage loans that have interest rates that are fixed for a specified period of time (typically three, five, seven or ten years) and, thereafter, adjust to a fixed increment over a specified interest rate index) are typically subject to periodic and lifetime interest rate caps. Periodic interest rate caps limit the amount an interest rate can increase during any given period. Lifetime interest rate caps limit the amount an interest rate can increase through the maturity of the loan. Our borrowings typically are not subject to similar restrictions. Accordingly, the ARMs and hybrid ARMs that we hold (or that back RMBS that we hold) expose us to interest rate mismatch risks. See "—Interest rate mismatches between our assets and our borrowings may reduce our income during periods of changing interest rates, and increases in interest rates could adversely affect the value of our assets."

Table of Contents

Certain actions by the Federal Reserve could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Actions by the Federal Reserve (and similar actions by other central banks), including tightening or easing of monetary policy, increases or decreases in short-term interest rates, balance sheet liquidations or runoff, or other actions, or the perception that the Federal Reserve or other central banks are failing to take actions deemed necessary or advisable by the market, could cause elevated market volatility and adversely impact the value and performance of our assets and our ability to borrow money at attractive terms or at all, or otherwise access capital to fund our operations. See also "—Increases in interest rates could adversely affect the value of our assets and cause our interest expense to increase, and increase the risk of default on our assets, which could result in reduced earnings or losses and negatively affect our profitability as well as the cash available for distribution to stockholders" for the impact of higher interest rates on our business.

If we subsequently resell or securitize any whole mortgage loans that we acquire, we may be required to repurchase such loans or indemnify purchasers if we breach representations and warranties.

If we subsequently resell or securitize any whole mortgage loans that we acquire, we would generally be required to make customary representations and warranties about such loans to the loan purchaser or securitization trust. Our residential mortgage loan sale agreements and terms of any securitizations into which we sell loans will generally require us to repurchase or substitute loans in the event we breach a representation or warranty given to the loan purchaser. In addition, we may be required to repurchase loans as a result of borrower fraud or in the event of early payment default on a mortgage loan. Such repurchase demands would be expected to rise if the loans we have sold or securitized experience poor credit performance.

The remedies available to a purchaser of mortgage loans that we have sold are generally broader than those available to us against an originating broker or correspondent. Repurchased loans are typically worth only a fraction of the original price. Significant repurchase activity against us could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

The commercial mortgage loans that we acquire or originate, and the mortgage loans underlying our CMBS investments, are subject to the ability of the commercial property owner to generate net income from operating the property as well as to the risks of delinquency and foreclosure.

Commercial mortgage loans are secured by commercial property and are subject to risks of delinquency and foreclosure, and risk of loss that may be greater than similar risks associated with loans made on the security of single-family residential property. The ability of a borrower to repay a loan secured by an income-producing property typically is dependent primarily upon the successful operation of such property rather than upon the existence of independent income or assets of the borrower. If the net operating income of the property is reduced, the borrower’s ability to repay the loan may be impaired. Furthermore, the market value of a commercial mortgage property is often driven by a “capitalization rate,” which represents the annual net operating income of the property expressed as a percentage of its market value. Capitalization rates tend to be correlated with long-term interest rates, and have trended higher recently in sympathy with rising long-term interest rates, which has degraded the market value of many commercial properties. Upon maturity of our commercial mortgage loans, declines in the net operating income of the property and/or increases in then-prevailing capitalization rates (especially if interest rates have risen substantially from the time the loan was originated), may cause declines in the market value of the property, which could cause the borrower to be unable to refinance or repay the maturing loan.

Net operating income of an income-producing property can be adversely affected by, among other things:

•tenant mix;

•declines in tenant income and/or changes to tenant businesses;

•property management decisions;

•property location, condition, and design;

•new construction of competitive properties;

•changes in laws that increase operating expenses or limit rents that may be charged;

•changes in national, regional, or local economic conditions and/or specific industry segments, including the credit and securitization markets;

•declines in regional or local real estate values;

•declines in regional or local rental or occupancy rates;

•increases in interest rates, real estate tax rates, and other operating expenses;

•costs of remediation and liabilities associated with environmental conditions;

Table of Contents

•the potential for uninsured or underinsured property losses;

•changes in governmental laws and regulations, including fiscal policies, zoning ordinances and environmental legislation, and the related costs of compliance; and

•general economic downturn, high energy costs, high unemployment, acts of God, pandemics such as the COVID-19 pandemic, war or other geopolitical conflict, terrorism, elevated inflation, social unrest, and civil disturbances.

In the event of any default under a mortgage loan held directly by us, we will bear a risk of loss to the extent of any deficiency between the value of the collateral and our cost basis in the outstanding principal and accrued interest of the mortgage loan, and any such losses could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

In addition, there were several notable regional bank failures in the U.S. during 2023, many of which held a significant amount of commercial mortgage loans. There is a possibility that any resulting instability of the banking system could reduce the rate of global economic growth and might lead to a recessionary environment in certain economies, including the U.S. or Europe. Any decline in the commercial real estate market related to the failed regional banks could have a materially adverse impact on our commercial mortgage loans and REO and could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

CMBS are secured by a single commercial mortgage loan or a pool of commercial mortgage loans. Accordingly, the CMBS we invest in are subject to all of the risks of the respective underlying commercial mortgage loans.

We also have commercial mortgage loans and CMBS where the value of the underlying properties, such as office properties, hotels, and healthcare properties, partly relies on the value associated with the operating businesses at those properties. As such, these loans bear the risks associated with the values of those commercial properties, as well as the risks associated with the underlying operating businesses, which could be thinly capitalized, highly leveraged, dependent on a small number of key individuals, subject to regulatory concerns, underperform expectations, or face other obstacles that could adversely affect the business and results of operations of any such entity. Office properties are subject to potential valuation declines related to disruptions or changes in business practices caused by technological or other innovations (such as businesses adopting remote work policies, shared spaces, and/or co-working environments), workforce reductions in certain market segments, or other factors, which has recently negatively impacted, and may continue to negatively impact, office demand in the commercial real estate sector, rental rates and occupancy levels. Distress in the commercial real estate sector, including office properties, such as that experienced since 2023, has negatively impacted and may continue to negatively impact certain commercial real estate-related markets in which we invest, including for example, as a result of low occupancy rates, tenant defaults, the maturation of a significant amount of commercial real estate loans amid an elevated interest rate environment, tightening credit conditions imposed by traditional sources of real estate financing and refinancing, and commercial mortgage loan defaults. If these commercial properties do not generate sufficient income to pay for ongoing operating expenses, our commercial mortgage loans and/or our CMBS may not generate enough principal and/or interest to justify our investment. A decline in the performance or value of commercial mortgage loans could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Our investments in CMBS are at risk of loss.

Our investments in CMBS are at risk of loss. In general, losses on real estate securing a mortgage loan included in a securitization will be borne first by the owner of the property, then by the holder of a mezzanine loan or a subordinated participation interest in a bifurcated first-lien loan, or "B-Note," if any, then by the "first-loss" subordinated security holder (generally, the B-piece buyer) and then by the holder of a higher-rated security. In the event of losses on mortgage loans included in a securitization and the subsequent exhaustion of any applicable reserve fund, letter of credit, or classes of securities junior to those in which we invest, we may not be able to recover all of our investment in the securities we purchase. In addition, if any of the real estate underlying the securitization mortgage portfolio has been overvalued by the originator, or if real estate values subsequently decline and, as a result, less collateral is available to satisfy interest and principal payments due on the related CMBS, we may incur losses. The prices of lower credit quality securities are generally less sensitive to interest rate changes than more highly rated investments, but more sensitive to adverse economic downturns or individual issuer developments.

Table of Contents

We may not control the special servicing of the mortgage loans included in the CMBS in which we invest and, in such cases, the special servicer may take actions that could adversely affect our interests.

With respect to the CMBS in which we invest, overall control over the special servicing of the related underlying mortgage loans will be held by a "directing certificateholder" or a "controlling class representative," which is generally appointed by the holders of the most subordinate class of CMBS in such series. In connection with the servicing of the specially serviced mortgage loans, the related special servicer may, at the direction of the directing certificateholder, take actions with respect to the specially serviced mortgage loans that could adversely affect our interests. For further discussion of the risks of our reliance on special servicers, see "—We rely on mortgage servicers to service effectively, including our loss mitigation efforts, and we also may engage in our own loss mitigation efforts with respect to whole mortgage loans that we own directly and such loss mitigation efforts may be unsuccessful or not cost effective."

A portion of our investments currently are, and in the future may be, in the form of non-performing and sub-performing commercial and residential mortgage loans, or loans that may become non-performing or sub-performing, which are subject to increased risks relative to performing loans.

A portion of our investments currently are, and in the future may be, in the form of commercial and residential whole mortgage loans, including subprime mortgage loans and non-performing and sub-performing mortgage loans, which are subject to increased risks of loss. Such loans may already be, or may become, non-performing or sub-performing for a variety of reasons, including because the underlying property is too highly leveraged, property cash flows are inadequate to support a full refinancing upon loan maturity, or the borrower falls upon financial distress. Such non-performing or sub-performing loans may require a substantial amount of workout negotiations and/or restructuring, which may divert the attention of our Manager from other activities and entail, among other things, a substantial reduction in the interest rate, capitalization of interest payments, and a substantial write-down of the principal of the loan. However, even if such restructuring were successfully accomplished, a risk exists that the borrower will not be able or willing to maintain the restructured payments or refinance the restructured mortgage upon maturity. In addition, such modifications could affect our compliance with the tests applicable to REITs, including by increasing our distribution requirement.

In addition, certain non-performing or sub-performing loans that we acquire may have been originated by financial institutions that are or may become insolvent, suffer from serious financial stress, or are no longer in existence. As a result, the standards by which such loans were originated, the recourse to the selling institution, and/or the standards by which such loans are being serviced or operated may be adversely affected. Further, loans on properties operating under the close supervision of a mortgage lender are, in certain circumstances, subject to certain additional potential liabilities that may exceed the value of our investment.

In the future, it is possible that we may find it necessary or desirable to foreclose on some, if not many, of the loans we acquire, and the foreclosure process may be lengthy and expensive. Borrowers or junior lenders may resist mortgage foreclosure actions by asserting numerous claims, counterclaims, and defenses against us including, without limitation, numerous lender liability claims and defenses, even when such assertions may have no basis in fact, in an effort to prolong the foreclosure action and force the lender into a modification of the loan or capital structure or a favorable buy-out of the borrower's or junior lender's position. In some states, foreclosure actions can sometimes take several years or more to litigate. At any time prior to or during the foreclosure proceedings, the borrower may file, or a junior lender may cause the borrower to file, for bankruptcy, which would have the effect of staying the foreclosure actions and further delaying the foreclosure process. Foreclosure and associated litigation may create a negative public perception of the related mortgaged property, resulting in a diminution of its value. Even if we are successful in foreclosing on a loan, the liquidation proceeds upon sale of the underlying real estate may not be sufficient to recover our cost basis in the loan, resulting in a loss to us, and the borrower or junior lenders may continue to challenge whether the foreclosure process was commercially reasonable, which could result in additional costs and potential liability. Any costs or delays involved in the effectuation of a foreclosure of the loan or a liquidation of the underlying property, or defending challenges brought after the completion of a foreclosure, will further reduce the liquidation proceeds and thus increase the loss. Any such reductions could materially and adversely affect the value we realize from the loans in which we invest.

Whether or not our Manager has participated in the negotiation of the terms of any such mortgage loans, there can be no assurance as to the adequacy of the protection of the terms of the loan, including the validity or enforceability of the loan and the maintenance of the anticipated priority and perfection of the applicable security interests. Furthermore, claims may be asserted that might interfere with enforcement of our rights. In the event of a foreclosure, we may assume direct ownership of the underlying real estate. The liquidation proceeds upon sale of such real estate may not be sufficient to recover our cost basis in the loan, resulting in a loss to us.

Commercial whole mortgage loans are also subject to special hazard risk and to bankruptcy risk. In addition, claims may be assessed against us on account of our position as mortgage holder or property owner, including assignee liability,

Table of Contents

responsibility for tax payments, environmental hazards and other liabilities. In some cases, these liabilities may be "recourse liabilities" or may otherwise lead to losses in excess of the purchase price of the related mortgage or property. Further, increased environmental regulations and climate-related risks could further impact the cost and complexity of managing foreclosed properties, particularly in states imposing stricter environmental compliance standards.

Our real estate assets and our real estate-related assets (including mortgage loans and MBS) are subject to the risks associated with real property.

We own assets secured by real estate, we own real estate directly, and we may acquire additional real estate directly in the future, either through direct acquisitions or upon a default of mortgage loans. Real estate assets are subject to various risks, including:

•declines in the value of real estate, including due to declining property cash flows or rising capitalization rates;

•acts of God, including pandemics, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, earthquakes, floods, droughts, wildfires, hurricanes, mudslides, volcanic eruptions and other natural disasters, which may result in uninsured losses;

•war or geopolitical conflict or terrorism, including the consequences of terrorist attacks, such as those that occurred on September 11, 2001;

•adverse changes in national and local economic and market conditions, including those related to high unemployment, elevated inflation and high energy costs;

•changes in governmental laws and regulations, fiscal policies and zoning ordinances and the related costs of compliance with laws and regulations, fiscal policies and zoning ordinances;

•costs of remediation and liabilities associated with environmental conditions such as indoor mold;

•potential liabilities for other legal actions related to property ownership including tort claims; and

•the potential for uninsured or under-insured property losses.

The occurrence of any of the foregoing or similar events could reduce our return from an affected property or asset and, consequently, could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

We engage in short selling transactions, which may subject us to additional risks.

Certain of our hedging transactions, and occasionally our investment transactions, may be short sales or short positions. Short selling may involve selling securities that are not owned and typically borrowing the same securities for delivery to the purchaser, with an obligation to repurchase the borrowed securities at a later date. Short selling allows the investor to profit from declines in market prices to the extent such declines exceed the transaction costs and the costs of borrowing the securities. A short sale may create the risk of an unlimited loss, in that the price of the underlying security might theoretically increase without limit, thus increasing the cost of repurchasing the securities. There can be no assurance that securities sold short will be available for repurchase or borrowing. Market conditions, including lower liquidity in certain asset classes and derivatives, and increased short sale restrictions imposed by regulators during periods of financial stress, could limit our ability to execute or maintain short positions effectively.

Repurchasing securities to close out a short position can itself cause the price of the securities to rise further, thereby exacerbating the loss, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Our investments that are denominated in foreign currencies, domiciled outside the U.S., or that involve non-U.S. assets are subject to risks associated with non-U.S. investing, including in some cases foreign currency risk, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Our investments that are denominated in foreign currencies subject us to foreign currency risk arising from fluctuations in exchange rates between such foreign currencies and the U.S. dollar. While we currently attempt to hedge the vast majority of our foreign currency exposure, we may not always choose to hedge such exposure, or we may not be able to hedge such exposure. To the extent that we are exposed to foreign currency risk, changes in exchange rates of such foreign currencies to the U.S. dollar could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Further, while our CLO investments are primarily in CLOs that hold underlying U.S. assets, we may also invest in CLOs that hold non-U.S. assets, and we expect that many of the CLO issuers in which we invest will be domiciled outside the United States. Investing directly or indirectly in non-U.S. issuers may expose us to additional risks, including political and social

Table of Contents

instability, expropriation, imposition of foreign taxes, less developed bankruptcy laws, difficulty in enforcing contractual obligations, lack of uniform accounting and auditing standards, currency fluctuations and greater price volatility. Further, we, and the CLOs in which we invest, may have difficulty enforcing creditor’s rights in foreign jurisdictions.

Risks Related to Our Financing, Hedging, and Derivative Activities

We use leverage in executing our business strategy, which may adversely affect the return on our assets and may reduce cash available for distribution to our stockholders, as well as increase losses when economic conditions are unfavorable.

We use leverage to finance our investment activities and to enhance our financial returns. Most of our leverage is in the form of short-term repos for our Agency and credit portfolio assets. Other forms of leverage include our term secured bank facilities, our securitizations, our unsecured borrowings and may in the future include credit facilities, including term loans and revolving credit facilities.

Through the use of leverage, we may acquire positions with market exposure significantly greater than the amount of capital committed to the transaction. For example, by entering into repos with haircut levels of 5%, we could theoretically leverage capital allocated to Agency RMBS by an asset-to-equity ratio of as much as 20 to 1. A haircut is the percentage discount that a repo lender applies to the market value of an asset serving as collateral for a repo borrowing, for the purpose of determining whether such repo borrowing is adequately collateralized.

Although we may from time to time enter into certain contracts with third parties that may limit our leverage, such as certain financing arrangements with lenders, our governing documents do not specifically limit the amount of leverage that we may use. Leverage can enhance our potential returns but can also exacerbate losses. Even if an asset increases in value, if the asset fails to earn a return that equals or exceeds our cost of borrowing, the leverage will diminish our returns.

Leverage also increases the risk of our being forced to precipitously liquidate our assets. See "—Our access to financing may not be available on favorable terms, may be limited or completely shut off, and our lenders and derivative counterparties may require us to post additional collateral. These circumstances could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders."

Our access to financing may not be available on favorable terms, or may be limited or completely shut off, and our lenders and derivative counterparties may require us to post additional collateral. These circumstances could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Our ability to fund our operations, meet financial obligations, and finance targeted asset acquisitions may be impacted by an inability to secure and maintain our financing through repurchase agreements or other borrowings with our counterparties. Because repurchase agreements are generally short-term transactions, lenders may respond to adverse market conditions in a manner that makes it more difficult for us to renew or replace on a continuous basis our maturing short-term borrowings and have, and may continue to, impose more onerous conditions when rolling such repurchase agreements.

Our lenders are primarily large global financial institutions, with exposures both to global financial markets and to more localized conditions. In addition to borrowing from large banks, we borrow from smaller non-bank financial institutions. Whether because of a global or local financial crisis or other circumstances, such as if one or more of our lenders experiences severe financial difficulties, they or other lenders could become unwilling or unable to provide us with financing, could increase the haircut required for such financing, or could increase the costs of that financing.

Moreover, we are currently party to short-term borrowings (in the form of repos) and there can be no assurance that we will be able to replace these borrowings, or "roll" them, as they mature on a continuous basis and it may be more difficult for us to obtain debt financing on favorable terms, or at all. If we are not able to renew our existing repurchase agreements or other borrowings, or arrange for new financing on terms acceptable to us, or if we default on our financial covenants (including those on our repurchase agreements, other borrowings, and our Senior Notes), are otherwise unable to access funds under our financing arrangements, or if we are required to post more collateral or face larger haircuts, we may have to dispose of assets at significantly depressed prices and at inopportune times, which could cause significant losses, and may also force us to curtail our asset acquisition activities. Similarly, if we were to move a financing from one counterparty to another that was subject to a larger haircut we would have to repay more cash to the original counterparty than we would be able to borrow from the new counterparty. To the extent that we might be compelled to liquidate qualifying real estate assets to repay debts, our compliance with the REIT asset tests, income tests, and distribution requirements could be negatively affected, which could jeopardize our qualification as a REIT. Losing our REIT qualification would cause us to be subject to U.S. federal income tax (and any applicable state and local taxes) on all of our income and decrease profitability and cash available to pay dividends to our stockholders. Any such forced liquidations could also materially adversely affect our ability to maintain our exclusion from registration as an investment company under the Investment Company Act.

Table of Contents

In addition, if there is a contraction in the overall availability of financing for our assets, including if the regulatory capital requirements imposed on our lenders change, our lenders may significantly increase the cost of the financing that they provide to us, or increase the amounts of collateral they require as a condition to providing us with financing. Our lenders also have revised, and may continue to revise, their eligibility requirements for the types of assets that they are willing to finance or the terms of such financing arrangements, including increased haircuts and requiring additional cash collateral, based on, among other factors, the regulatory environment and their management of actual and perceived risk, particularly with respect to assignee liability.

Moreover, the amount of financing that we receive under our financing agreements will be directly related to our lenders’ valuation of the financed assets subject to such agreements. Typically, the master repurchase agreements that govern our borrowings under repurchase agreements grant the lender the right to reevaluate the fair market value of the financed assets subject to such repurchase agreements at any time. If a lender determines that the net decrease in the value of the portfolio of financed assets is greater in magnitude than any applicable threshold, it will generally initiate a margin call. In such cases, a lender's valuations of the financed assets may be different than the values that we ascribe to these assets and may be influenced by recent asset sales at distressed levels by forced sellers. A valid margin call requires us to transfer cash or additional qualifying collateral to a lender or to repay a portion of the outstanding borrowings. If we were to dispute the validity of a margin call from a lender under one of our repo agreements and refuse to deliver margin collateral as a result, a lender could still send us a notice of default. In this situation, such lender will have possession of the financed assets, and might still decide to exercise its contractual remedies, despite the margin dispute. In the event of our default, our lenders or derivative counterparties can accelerate our indebtedness, terminate our derivative contracts (potentially on unfavorable terms requiring additional payments, including additional fees and costs), increase our borrowing rates, liquidate our collateral, and terminate our ability to borrow. In certain cases, a default on one repo agreement or derivative agreement (whether caused by a failure to satisfy margin calls or another event of default) can trigger "cross defaults" on other such agreements. In addition, if the market value of our derivative contracts with a derivative counterparty declines in value, we generally will be subject to a margin call by the derivative counterparty.

Significant margin calls and/or increased repo haircuts could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition, business, liquidity, and ability to make distributions to our stockholders, and could cause the value of our capital stock to decline. During March and April of 2020, we observed that many of our financing agreement counterparties assigned lower valuations to certain of our assets, resulting in us having to pay cash or transfer additional securities to satisfy margin calls, which were higher than historical levels. In addition, during March and April of 2020 we also experienced an increase in haircuts on repurchase agreements that we rolled. A sufficiently deep and/or rapid increase in margin calls or haircuts would have an adverse impact on our liquidity.

Consequently, depending on market conditions at the relevant time, we may have to rely on additional equity issuances to meet our capital and financing needs, which may be dilutive to our stockholders, or we may have to rely on less efficient forms of debt financing that consume a larger portion of our cash flow from operations, thereby reducing funds available for our operations, future business opportunities, cash dividends to our stockholders, and other purposes. There can be no assurance that we will have access to such equity or debt capital on favorable terms (including, without limitation, cost and term) at the desired times, or at all, which may cause us to curtail our asset acquisition activities and/or dispose of assets, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders, or in the worst case, cause our insolvency.

A failure to comply with restrictive covenants in our financing arrangements would have a material adverse effect on us, and any future financings may require us to provide additional collateral or pay down debt.

We are subject to various restrictive covenants contained in our existing financing arrangements and may become subject to additional covenants in connection with future financings. For example, the indenture governing our Senior Notes contains covenants that, subject to a number of exceptions and adjustments, among other things: limit our ability to incur additional indebtedness; require us to maintain a minimum Net Asset Value (as defined in the indenture governing the Senior Notes); require us to maintain a ratio of Consolidated Unencumbered Assets (as defined in indenture governing the Senior Notes) to the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding Senior Notes at or above a specified threshold, and impose certain conditions on our merger or consolidation with another person. In addition, the interest rate on our Senior Notes is subject to upward adjustment based on certain changes, if any, in the ratings of the Senior Notes. Furthermore, several of our repo agreements contain financial covenants of a similar nature, including requiring us to maintain a minimum level of liquidity, a minimum level of equity, and a maximum level of additional indebtedness.

The covenants in our financing arrangements may limit our flexibility to pursue certain investments or incur additional debt. If we fail to meet or satisfy any of these covenants, subject to any applicable cure provisions, we would be in default under these agreements and our indebtedness could be declared due and payable. In addition, our lenders could terminate their

Table of Contents

commitments, require the posting of additional collateral and enforce their interests against existing collateral. We may also be subject to cross-default and acceleration rights under our financing arrangements, whereby a default (such as a failure to comply with a covenant) under one financing arrangement can trigger a default under other financing arrangements.

Our securitizations may expose us to additional risks.

In order to generate additional cash for funding new investments, we have securitized, and may in the future seek to securitize certain of our assets, especially our loan assets. Some securitizations are treated as financing transactions for U.S. GAAP, while others are treated as sales. In a typical securitization, we convey assets to a special purpose vehicle, which then issues one or more classes of notes secured by the assets pursuant to the terms of an indenture. To the extent that we retain the most subordinated economic interests in the issuing vehicle, we would continue to be exposed to losses on the assets for as long as those retained interests remained outstanding and therefore able to absorb such losses. Furthermore, our retained interests in a securitization could be less liquid than the underlying assets themselves, and may be subject to U.S. Risk Retention Rules and similar European rules. Moreover, even though we might accumulate assets with a view towards possible securitization, we cannot be assured that we will be able to access the securitization market, or be able to do so under favorable terms. The inability to securitize certain segments of our portfolio, especially certain of our loan assets, could force us to resort to what may be inferior methods of financing those assets, could force us to sell those loan assets at inopportune times, and could adversely impact our ability to grow our loan acquisition businesses. Furthermore, because we have entered into and may in the future enter into securitization transactions alongside other entities, including other Ellington affiliates, there may be conflicts between us, on the one hand, and the other entities, including other Ellington affiliates, on the other hand.

In addition, in anticipation of a securitization transaction, we (either alone or in conjunction with other investors, including other Ellington affiliates) have in the past, and may again in the future, provide capital to a vehicle accumulating assets for the securitization. If such a securitization is not ultimately completed, or if the assets do not perform as expected during the accumulation period, we could lose all or a portion of the capital that we provided to the vehicle. Furthermore, because we may enter into these types of transactions along with other investors, including other Ellington affiliates, there may be conflicts between us, on the one hand, and the other investors, including other Ellington affiliates, on the other hand. These accumulation vehicles typically enter into warehouse financing facilities to facilitate their accumulation of assets, and so such vehicles carry with them the additional risks associated with financial leverage and covenant compliance.

In connection with our securitizations, we generally are required to prepare disclosure documentation for investors, including term sheets and offering memoranda, which contain information regarding the securitization generally, the securities being issued, and the assets being securitized. If our disclosure documentation for a securitization is alleged or found to contain material inaccuracies or omissions, we may be liable under federal securities laws, state securities laws or other applicable laws for damages to the investors in such securitization, we may be required to indemnify the underwriters of the securitization or other parties, and/or we may incur other expenses and costs in connection with disputing these allegations or settling claims. Such liabilities, expenses, and/or losses could be significant.

We will typically be required to make representations and warranties in connection with our securitizations regarding, among other things, certain characteristics of the assets being securitized. If any of the representations and warranties that we have made concerning the assets are alleged or found to be inaccurate, we may incur expenses disputing the allegations, and we may be obligated to repurchase certain assets, which may result in losses. Even if we previously obtained representations and warranties from loan originators or other parties from whom we originally acquired the assets, such representations and warranties may not align with those that we have made for the benefit of the securitization, or may otherwise not protect us from losses, including as a result of the deterioration in the financial condition of the party that provided representations and warranties to us.

Longbridge assumes certain obligations related to each security issued in its securitizations. One significant obligation is the requirement to purchase any HECM loan out of the HMBS if the outstanding principal balance of such loan is equal to or greater than 98% of the maximum claim amount ("MCA Repurchases"). Active repurchased loans are assigned to HUD, and HUD reimburses Longbridge for the outstanding principal balance on the loan up to the maximum claim amount. Longbridge bears the risk to the extent that the amount of the outstanding principal balance on a loan exceeds the maximum claim amount. Inactive repurchased loans, which are loans where a default or maturity event has occurred, such as the borrower passing away, no longer occupying the property or becoming delinquent on tax and insurance payments, are generally liquidated through foreclosure and subsequent sale of real estate owned property (“REO”), with a claim filed with HUD for recoverable remaining principal and advance balances. The recovery timeline for inactive repurchased loans depends on various factors, including foreclosure status at the time of repurchase, state-level foreclosure timelines, and the post-foreclosure REO liquidation timeline. The timing and amount of Longbridge’s obligation with respect to MCA Repurchases is uncertain as repurchase is dependent largely on circumstances outside of Longbridge’s control, including the amount and timing of future draws, the status of the loan, and interest rates. MCA Repurchases are expected to continue to increase due to the increased flow of HECMs and REO

Table of Contents

that are reaching 98% of their maximum claim amount. We typically fund these repurchase obligations using available cash and/or borrowing facilities to finance a portion of the repurchase amount. However, to the extent that our funding commitments exceed our borrowing capacity under these facilities, if we are unable to renew these facilities upon their maturities, we would be solely dependent on available cash to meet these commitments. If our liquidity position is insufficient to fund these amounts, this could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders. In addition, when using these facilities to finance the repurchase, Longbridge also typically earns an interest rate that is frequently less than the cost of financing, and also incurs certain non-reimbursable costs during the process of liquidating nonperforming loans.

If Longbridge is unable to fund its tail funding commitments or securitize its HECM loans (including tail pools), or if HMBS tail pool prices decline, this could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Longbridge originates and services HECM loans where the borrower has an undrawn line of credit entitling the borrower to demand future draws, which Longbridge as servicer is obligated to fund. As of December 31, 2024 our commitment to fund such additional borrowing capacity was $2.1 billion. In addition, we are required to advance mortgage insurance premiums on behalf of HECM borrowers. We typically fund these obligations on a short-term basis using available cash and/or our credit facilities, and regularly securitize these amounts (along with our servicing fees) through the issuance of HMBS tail securitizations.

A substantial portion of reverse MSR values comes from the expectation that while the servicer funds such future draws at par, it will be able to securitize and sell such future draws at a premium. When valuing Longbridge’s reverse MSRs, the prices assumed for subsequent HMBS tail pools reflect market conditions that may not be realized. If the actual prices earned on these HMBS pools are lower than forecast, the value of Longbridge’s reverse MSRs could be materially adversely impacted.

We have also entered into an agreement for a revolving credit facility to finance a portfolio of these tail draws prior to their securitization into HMBS. However, to the extent that our funding commitments exceed our borrowing capacity under this facility, or if we are unable to renew this facility upon its maturity in May 2025, we would be dependent on available cash to meet these commitments. If Longbridge’s liquidity position is insufficient to fund these amounts and Longbridge is unable to fund them through the securitization of the tails into HMBS, this could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Hedging against credit events, interest rate changes, foreign currency fluctuations, and other risks could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Subject to maintaining our qualification as a REIT and maintaining our exclusion from registration as an investment company under the Investment Company Act, we opportunistically pursue various hedging strategies to seek to reduce our exposure to losses from adverse credit events, interest rate changes, foreign currency fluctuations, and other risks. Hedging against a decline in the values of our portfolio positions does not prevent losses if the values of such positions decline, nor does it eliminate the possibility of fluctuations in the value of our portfolio. Hedging transactions generally will limit the opportunity for gain should the values of our other portfolio positions increase. Further, certain hedging transactions could result in significant losses. Qualification as a REIT may require that we forgo certain hedging activities or undertake certain hedging activities in a TRS. Our domestic TRSs are subject to U.S. federal, state, and local income tax. Moreover, at any point in time we may choose not to hedge all or a portion of our risks, and we generally will not hedge those risks that we believe are appropriate for us to take at such time, or that we believe would be impractical or prohibitively expensive to hedge. Even if we do choose to hedge certain risks, for a variety of reasons we generally will not seek to establish a perfect correlation between our hedging instruments and the risks being hedged. Any such imperfect correlation may prevent us from achieving the intended hedge and expose us to risk of loss. Our hedging activity will vary in scope based on the composition of our portfolio, our market views, and changing market conditions, including the level and volatility of interest rates. When we do choose to hedge, hedging may fail to protect or could materially adversely affect us because, among other things:

•our Manager may fail to correctly assess the degree of correlation between the hedging instruments and the assets being hedged;

•our Manager may fail to recalculate, re-adjust, and execute hedges in an efficient and timely manner;

•the hedging transactions may actually result in poorer overall performance for us than if we had not engaged in the hedging transactions;

•credit hedging can be expensive, particularly when the market is forecasting future credit deterioration and when markets are more illiquid;

•interest rate hedging can be expensive, particularly during periods of volatile interest rates;

Table of Contents

•available hedges may not correspond directly, or be correlated in the manner desired, with the risks for which protection is sought;

•the durations of the hedges may not match the durations of the related assets or liabilities being hedged;

•many hedges are structured as over-the-counter contracts with counterparties whose creditworthiness is not guaranteed, raising the possibility that the hedging counterparty may default on their payment obligations;

•to the extent that the creditworthiness of a hedging counterparty deteriorates, it may be difficult or impossible to terminate or assign any hedging transactions with such counterparty;

•the value of derivatives used for hedging may be adjusted from time to time in accordance with accounting rules to reflect changes in fair value. Downward adjustments would reduce our earnings and our stockholders' equity; and

•our hedging instruments are generally structured as derivative contracts and, as a result, are subject to additional risks such as those described under "—Our access to financing sources may not be available on favorable terms, may be limited or completely shut off, and our lenders and derivative counterparties could require us to post additional collateral. These circumstances could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders" and "—Our use of derivatives may expose us to counterparty risk."

For these and other reasons, our hedging activity could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders, and our ability to maintain our qualification as a REIT.

Hedging instruments and other derivatives, including some credit default swaps, may not, in many cases, be traded on regulated exchanges, or may not be guaranteed or regulated by any U.S. or foreign governmental authority and involve risks and costs that could result in material losses.

Hedging instruments and other derivatives, including certain types of credit default swaps, involve risk because they may not, in many cases, be traded on exchanges or cleared on a CCP (as defined below) and may not be guaranteed or regulated by any U.S. or foreign governmental authorities. Consequently, for these instruments there may be less stringent requirements with respect to record keeping and compliance with applicable statutory and commodity and other regulatory requirements and, depending on the identity of the counterparty, applicable international requirements. Our Manager is not restricted from dealing with any particular counterparty or from concentrating any or all of its transactions with one counterparty. Furthermore, our Manager has only a limited internal credit function to evaluate the creditworthiness of its counterparties, mainly relying on its experience with such counterparties and/or their general reputation as participants in these markets. Under the terms of many of our derivative transaction contracts, the business failure of a derivative counterparty with whom we enter into a derivative transaction will most likely result in a default under the governing arrangement. Default by a party with whom we enter into a derivative transaction may result in losses and may force us to re-initiate similar derivative transactions with other counterparties at the then-prevailing market levels. Generally we will seek to reserve the right to terminate derivative transactions upon a counterparty's insolvency, but absent an actual insolvency, we may not be able to terminate derivative transaction without the consent of the counterparty, and we may not be able to assign or otherwise dispose of derivative transactions to another counterparty without the consent of both the original counterparty and the potential assignee. If we terminate a derivative transaction, we may not be able to enter into a replacement contract in order to cover our risk. There can be no assurance that a liquid secondary market will exist for derivative instruments purchased or sold, and therefore we may be required to maintain any derivative positions until exercise or expiration, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders. In this regard, we may be required to hold additional cash or sell other investments in order to obtain cash to close out derivatives to meet the liquidity demands that derivatives can create to make payments of margin, collateral or settlement payments to counterparties. We may have to sell an investment at a disadvantageous time or price to meet such obligations.

In addition, some portion of our derivatives, including our futures positions, are cleared through a central counterparty clearinghouse, or "CCP," which we access through a futures commission merchant, or "FCM." If an FCM that holds our cleared derivatives account were to become insolvent, the CCP will make an effort to move our futures and swap positions to an alternate FCM, though it is possible that no alternate FCM could be found to accept our positions, which could result in a total cancellation of our positions in the account; in such a case, if we wished to reinstate such derivative positions, we would have to re-initiate such positions with an alternate FCM. In the event of the insolvency of an FCM that holds our cleared over-the-counter derivatives, the rules of the CCP require that its direct members submit bids to take over the portfolio of the FCM, and would further require the CCP to move our existing positions and related margin to an alternate FCM. If this were to occur, we believe that our risk of loss would be limited to the excess equity in the account at the insolvent FCM due to the "legally segregated, operationally commingled" treatment of client assets under the rules governing FCMs in respect of cleared over-the-counter derivatives. In addition, in the case of both futures and cleared over-the-counter derivatives, there could be knock-on effects of our FCM's insolvency, such as the failure of co-customers of the FCM or other FCMs of the same CCP. In such

Table of Contents

cases, there could be a shortfall in the funds available to the CCP due to such additional insolvencies and/or exhaustion of the CCP's guaranty fund that could lead to total loss of our positions in the FCM account. Finally, we face a risk of loss (including total cancellation) of positions in the account in the event of fraud by our FCM or other FCMs of the CCP, where ordinary course remedies would not apply.

Using derivatives is also subject to operational and legal risks. Operational risk generally refers to risk related to potential operational issues, including documentation issues, settlement issues, systems failures, inadequate controls, and human error. Legal risk generally refers to insufficient documentation, insufficient capacity or authority of counterparty, or the legality or enforceability of a contract.

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or "CFTC," and certain commodity exchanges have established limits referred to as speculative position limits or position limits on the maximum net long or net short position which any person or group of persons may hold or control in particular futures and options. Limits on trading in options contracts also have been established by the various options exchanges. It is possible that trading decisions may have to be modified and that positions held may have to be liquidated in order to avoid exceeding such limits. Such modification or liquidation, if required, could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

Our use of derivatives may expose us to counterparty risk.

We enter into derivative transactions that have not been cleared by a CCP. If a derivative counterparty cannot perform under the terms of the derivative contract, we would not receive payments due under that agreement, we may lose any unrealized gain associated with the derivative, and in the case of a derivative used as a hedging instrument, the asset or liability being hedged would cease to be hedged by such instrument. If a derivative counterparty becomes insolvent or files for bankruptcy, we may also be at risk for any collateral we have pledged to such counterparty to secure our obligations under derivative contracts, and we may incur significant costs in attempting to recover such collateral.

Our rights under our repos are subject to the effects of the bankruptcy laws in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of us or our lenders.

In the event of our insolvency or bankruptcy, certain repos may qualify for special treatment under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the effect of which, among other things, would be to allow the lender to avoid the automatic stay provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and to foreclose on and/or liquidate the collateral pledged under such agreements without delay. In the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a lender during the term of a repo, the lender may be permitted, under applicable insolvency laws, to repudiate the contract, and our claim against the lender for damages may be treated simply as an unsecured claim. In addition, if the lender is a broker or dealer subject to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, or an insured depository institution subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, our ability to exercise our rights to recover our securities under a repo or to be compensated for any damages resulting from the lenders' insolvency may be further limited by those statutes. These claims would be subject to significant delay and costs to us and, if and when received, may be substantially less than the damages we actually incur.

Risks Related to Corporate Loans and CLOs

We invest in corporate loans and CLOs backed by corporate loans, which exposes us to certain risks.

We invest in corporate loans and CLOs backed by corporate loans. The assets underlying our CLO investments generally consist of lower-rated first-lien corporate loans, although certain CLO structures may also allow for limited exposure to other asset classes including unsecured loans, second-lien loans, or corporate bonds. Corporate issuers of lower-rated debt securities may be highly leveraged and may not have available to them more traditional methods of financing. During economic downturns or sustained periods of rising interest rates, issuers of lower-rated debt securities may be likely to experience financial stress, especially if such issuers are highly leveraged. The risk of loss for lower-rated debt securities is also magnified to the extent that such securities are unsecured or subordinated to more senior creditors. Lower-rated debt securities generally have limited liquidity and limited secondary market support. These risks are further exacerbated in the case of second-lien loans, as they are subordinated to first-lien loans and have weaker recovery prospects in the event of borrower distress or default.

We, and the CLOs in which we invest, may acquire loans to smaller companies, or “middle market” loans, which may carry more inherent risks than loans to larger, publicly traded entities. Compared to larger companies, these middle-market companies tend to have more limited access to capital, weaker financial positions, narrower product lines, and tend to be more vulnerable to competitors’ actions and market conditions, as well as to general economic downturns. As a result, the securities issued by CLOs that hold significant investments in middle-market loans are generally considered riskier than securities issued by CLOs that primarily invest in broadly syndicated loans.

Table of Contents

The corporate loans that we hold directly, or that underlie our CLO investments, may become nonperforming or impaired for a variety of reasons. Nonperforming or impaired loans may require substantial workout negotiations or restructurings that may result in significant delays in repayment, a significant reduction in the interest rate, and/or a significant write-down of the principal of the loan. A wide range of factors could adversely affect the ability of an underlying corporate borrower to make interest or other payments on its loan. The corporate issuers of the loans or securities that we hold, or that underlie our CLO investments, may be highly leveraged and may be subject to an increased risk of default depending on certain micro- or macro-economic conditions, such as economic recessions, heightened interest rates and/or inflation, tariffs, and other conditions. Such defaults and losses, especially those in excess of the market’s or our expectations, would have a negative impact on the fair value of our investments, and reduce the cash flows that we receive from our investments, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

In addition, "covenant-lite" corporate loans may comprise a significant portion the corporate loan market, including the underlying collateral of the CLOs in which we invest. Generally, covenant-lite corporate loans provide the obligor with more freedom to take actions that could negatively impact their lenders because the obligor's covenants are incurrence-based and not maintenance-based, which means that they are only tested and can only be breached following an affirmative action of the borrower, rather than by a deterioration in the borrower’s financial condition. As a result, lenders may have a more limited ability to intervene at early signs of financial distress, potentially increasing the risk of loss on such investments as compared to corporate loans (or CLOs with underlying corporate loans) with more traditional, maintenance-based covenants.

We may acquire, and the CLOs in which we invest may acquire, interests in corporate loans indirectly, by way of participations. In a participation, the underlying debt obligation remains with the institution that has sold the participation, which typically results in a contractual relationship only with such selling institution, and not with the corporate obligor directly. As a result, the holder of a participation assumes the credit risk of both the obligor and the selling institution, and may only have limited rights to influence any decisions made by the selling institution in connection with the underlying debt obligation.

We, and the CLOs in which we invest, may be subject to risks associated with syndicated loans.

Under the documentation for syndicated loans, a financial institution or other entity typically is designated as the administrative agent and/or collateral agent. This agent is granted a lien on any collateral on behalf of the other lenders and distributes payments on the indebtedness as they are received. The agent is the party responsible for administering and enforcing the loan and generally may take actions only in accordance with the instructions of a majority or two-thirds in commitments and/or principal amount of the associated indebtedness. In most cases for our syndicated loan investments, we do not expect to hold a sufficient amount of the indebtedness to be able to compel any actions by the agent. Consequently, we would only be able to direct such actions if instructions from us were made in conjunction with other holders of associated indebtedness that together with us compose the requisite percentage of the related indebtedness then entitled to take action. Conversely, if holders of the required amount of the associated indebtedness other than us desire to take certain actions, such actions may be taken even if we did not support such actions. Furthermore, if a syndicated loan is subordinated to one or more senior loans made to the applicable obligor, our ability to exercise such rights may be subordinated to the exercise of such rights by the senior lenders. Whenever we are unable to direct such actions, the parties taking such actions may not have interests that are aligned with us, and the actions taken may not be in our best interests. Furthermore, in recent years, “priming” transactions in the distressed debt sector have become more common. These “priming” arrangements are transactions where a group of debtholders can move collateral away from existing lenders so that it can serve as the primary source of secured assets for new money and/or restructuring existing debt. If we were to hold distressed debt that became “primed” by another group of lenders, we could lose all or a significant part of such investment.

If an investment is a syndicated revolving loan or delayed drawdown loan, other lenders may fail to satisfy their full contractual funding commitments for such loan, which could create a breach of contract, result in a lawsuit by the obligor against the lenders and adversely affect the fair market value of our investment.

There is a risk that a loan agent may become bankrupt or insolvent. Such an event would delay, and possibly impair, any enforcement actions undertaken by holders of the associated indebtedness, including attempts to realize upon the collateral securing the associated indebtedness and/or direct the agent to take actions against the related obligor or the collateral securing the associated indebtedness and actions to realize on proceeds of payments made by obligors that are in the possession or control of any other financial institution. In addition, we may be unable to remove the agent in circumstances in which removal would be in our best interests. Moreover, agented loans typically allow for the agent to resign with certain advance notice, and we may not find a replacement agent on a timely basis, or at all, in order to protect our investment.

Table of Contents

Our investments in corporate CLOs involve certain risks.

Investments in corporate CLO securities involve certain risks. Corporate CLOs are securitizations that are typically backed by a pool of corporate loans or similar corporate credit-related assets that serve as collateral. We and other investors in CLOs ultimately bear the credit risk of the underlying collateral. Most CLOs are issued in multiple tranches, offering investors various maturity and credit risk characteristics, often categorized as senior, mezzanine and subordinated/equity according to their relative seniority and degree of risk. If the relevant collateral defaults or otherwise underperforms, payments to the more senior tranches of such securitizations take precedence over those of more junior tranches, such as mezzanine debt and equity tranches, which are the focus of our corporate CLO investment strategy. CLOs present risks similar to those of other types of credit investments, including credit, interest rate and prepayment risks. See "— We invest in corporate loans and CLOs backed by corporate loans, which exposes us to certain risks.”

In addition, if a CLO in which we invest experiences an event of default as a result of failure to make a payment when due, erosion of the underlying collateral, or for other reasons, the CLO would be subject to the possibility of liquidation. In such cases, the risks are heightened that the collateral underlying the CLO may not be able to be readily liquidated, or that when liquidated, the resulting proceeds would be insufficient to redeem the CLO mezzanine debt and equity tranches that are the focus of our corporate CLO investment strategy. CLO equity tranches often suffer a loss of all of their value in these circumstances, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders. Furthermore, following an event of default by a CLO, the holders of CLO mezzanine debt and equity tranches typically have limited rights regarding decisions made with respect to the underlying collateral, with the result that such decisions might favor the more senior tranches of the CLO.

Even though we expect that most of our CLO mezzanine debt investments will have floating rate coupons, these and other of our CLO investments are still exposed to interest rate risk. There can be significant mismatches between the timing and frequency of coupon resets on the floating rate CLO debt tranches and the underlying floating rate corporate loans, and furthermore some of the underlying corporate loans may bear fixed coupon rates. When interest rates are low but increasing, variations between interest rate floors on the CLO debt tranches and the underlying corporate loans can reduce the amount of excess interest available for payment to the CLO debt and equity tranches. This reduction in excess interest could adversely impact our CLO equity cashflows and valuations, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

CLOs have at times experienced negative credit events in their constituent loans, credit rating downgrades of constituent loans and issued debt tranches, and failures of certain deal metrics. The failure by a CLO in which we invest to satisfy certain tests, including with respect to adequate collateralization and/or interest coverage, would generally lead to a reduction in the payments made to holders of its mezzanine debt and equity tranches. Ratings downgrades on our CLO debt investments may result in our investments being viewed as riskier than they were previously thought to be. This perception of increased riskiness resulting from a downgrade can result in adverse impacts to the market value and liquidity of our CLO debt investments, as well as reduce the availability or increase the cost of repo financing for our CLO debt investments.

Our corporate loans and CLO investments are subject to risks related to the financial leverage employed by the underlying corporate borrowers.

Our corporate borrowers may be, and the corporate borrowers underlying our CLO investments typically are, highly leveraged, and there may be few or no restrictions on the amount of indebtedness such borrowers can incur. Substantial indebtedness adds additional risk with respect to a borrower and could (i) limit its ability to borrow money or otherwise access funds for its working capital, capital expenditures, debt service requirements, strategic initiatives or other purposes; (ii) require it to dedicate a substantial portion of its cash flow from operations to the repayment of its indebtedness, thereby reducing funds available to it for other purposes; (iii) make it more highly leveraged than some of its competitors, which may place it at a competitive disadvantage; and/or (iv) subject it to restrictive financial and operating covenants, which may preclude it from executing on favorable business activities or from financing future operations or other capital needs. In some cases, proceeds of indebtedness incurred by a borrower could be paid as a dividend to its equity holders rather than retained by the borrowers for its working capital or to pursue favorable opportunities. Highly leveraged companies are often more sensitive to declines in revenues, increases in expenses, and adverse business, political, or financial developments or economic factors such as a significant rise in interest rates, a severe downturn in the economy, or deterioration in the condition of such companies or their industries. A leveraged company’s income and net assets will tend to increase or decrease at a greater rate than if borrowed money were not used.

If an underlying borrower is unable to generate sufficient cash flow to meet principal and/or interest payments on its indebtedness, it may be forced to take other actions to satisfy its obligations under its indebtedness. These alternative actions may include reducing or delaying capital expenditures, selling assets, seeking additional capital, or restructuring or refinancing indebtedness. Any of these actions could significantly reduce the value of the related asset held by us or a CLO in which we

Table of Contents

invest. Furthermore, if the borrower is unable to meet its scheduled debt service obligations even after taking these actions, the borrower may be forced into liquidation, dissolution or insolvency, and the value of the related loan could be significantly impaired or even rendered worthless.

We are dependent on the collateral managers of the CLOs in which we invest.

We invest in CLO securities issued by CLOs that are managed by collateral managers unaffiliated with us, and we are dependent on the skill and expertise of such managers. While the actions of the CLO collateral managers may significantly affect the return on our investments, we typically do not have any direct contractual relationship with these collateral managers.

While we also rely on these collateral managers to act in the best interests of the CLOs in which we invest, there can be no assurance that such collateral managers will do so. Moreover, such collateral managers are subject to fiduciary duties owed to other classes of notes besides those in which we invest, and they may have other incentives to manage the CLO portfolios in a manner that disadvantages the particular classes of notes in which we are invested. Furthermore, since the CLO issuer often provides an indemnity to its collateral manager, the CLO tranches we hold may ultimately bear the burden of any legal claims brought against the collateral manager.

We may only have limited information regarding the underlying assets held by the CLOs in which we invest, and collateral managers may not identify or report issues relating to the underlying assets on a timely basis (or at all) to enable us to take appropriate measures to manage our risks.

CLO collateral managers are subject to removal or replacement by other holders of CLO securities without our consent and may also voluntarily resign as collateral manager or assign their role as collateral manager to another entity. The removal, replacement, resignation, or assignment of any particular CLO collateral manager’s role could adversely affect the returns on the CLO securities in which we invest, which could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

We are subject to risks associated with loan accumulation facilities.

We may invest in CLO warehouse facilities, otherwise known as loan accumulation facilities, or "LAFs." LAFs are generally short- to medium- term financing facilities provided by the investment bank that will ultimately serve as the arranger on a CLO transaction. Utilizing equity capital provided by the LAF investors and debt financing provided by the investment bank, LAFs acquire corporate loans and other similar corporate credit-related assets in anticipation of ultimately collateralizing a CLO transaction. This period of accumulating assets, often known as the "warehouse period," typically terminates when the CLO vehicle issues various tranches of debt and equity securities to the market, using the issuance proceeds to repay the investment bank financing. Investments in LAFs have risks similar to those applicable to investments in CLOs, and the risk of losses is magnified as a result of the leveraged and first-loss nature of these facilities. Further, in the event that the corporate credit assets accumulated by a LAF are not eligible for purchase by the planned CLO, or in the event that the planned CLO is not issued, the LAF investors may be responsible for either holding or disposing of said assets, exposing us to credit and/or mark-to-market risk. This scenario may become more likely in times of economic distress or when the loans comprising the collateral pool of such warehouse, even if still performing, may have declined materially in market value, and we may suffer a loss upon the disposition of these assets. The occurrence of any of the foregoing or similar events could affect our investments in LAFs and, consequently, could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders.

We may invest in distressed debt and equity, which involve significant risks, including uncertainty of recovery and exposure to bankruptcy proceedings.

We may make investments in distressed debt and equity, including in companies that are highly leveraged, thinly capitalized, in early-stage development, or experiencing financial distress. In addition, the corporate loans purchased by the CLOs in which we invest may become distressed, or be converted to equity in the event of a bankruptcy or other restructuring of the corporate issuer. These investments involve a significant risk of loss and are often subject to uncertainty regarding the timing, manner, and ultimate value of any recovery, particularly in bankruptcy proceedings, which these investments are more likely to be subject to.

In the case of distressed debt, potential recoveries may occur through asset liquidation, exchange offers, reorganization plans, or partial repayments. However, there is no assurance that the securities or assets received in such transactions will retain their anticipated value or income potential. Additionally, these securities may be subject to resale restrictions, limiting our ability to liquidate our positions.

Bankruptcy proceedings related to these investments may be adversarial and unpredictable, with outcomes beyond our control. If a company in which we hold a debt or equity investment files for bankruptcy, we may suffer a permanent loss. In

Table of Contents

liquidation scenarios, asset values may have significantly declined from our initial projections, reducing potential recoveries. The duration of bankruptcy proceedings is difficult to predict, and delays in confirming a plan of reorganization or liquidation can adversely affect investment returns. Administrative costs, which are typically high, are paid out of the debtor’s estate before any distributions to creditors. Furthermore, because the classification of claims under bankruptcy law can be uncertain, our influence in restructuring proceedings may be diminished. Undisclosed or contingent claims may also erode recoveries. Moreover, bankruptcy courts have the authority to recharacterize debt investments as equity, which could subordinate our claims to those of other creditors. This risk exists even if our investment was originally structured as senior debt, potentially leading to significant or total investment loss.

We have made and may in the future make investments in companies that we do not control.

EFC US Equity

EFC · 10-K · period ended 2024-12-31

Item 1A. Risk Factors

EFC US Equity☆

EFC · 10-K · period ended 2024-12-31

Item 1A. Risk Factors

EFC US Equity